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INTRODUCTION 
The twelve years bet\'1een the end of the Boer War (1899-
1902) and August 1914 were a period of military reform for 
Britain. As a result of Army errors and deficiencies, the 
military came under criticism and ultimately reform. The 
Army was transformed from an unwieldy conglomeration of 
units into an expandable striking force ready for overseas 
service. Though the Navy had not been involved in the South 
African fighting, its defects were readily apparent in the 
light of postwar reform. So too were those of high level 
military policy making which was then revamped through the 
creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
British confidence was badly shaken by the period of 
Army defeat in December 1899 termed "Black Week." During 
this week of disaster, a British field army superior in size 
to that of the Boers was defeated at several points with 
large sections of the British Cape Colony falling under . 
Boer control. r1anpower losses were light in comparison to 
European battles-the British lost 1,700 men at their bloodi-
est defeat while the Austrians had suffered over 20,000 
casulties at Sadowa-yet these losses were still severe. for 
a nation used to police actions against poorly armed and 
disciplined natiV'es. 1 Victory was finally achieved only by 
employing over 450,000 regulars, reservists, militia, and 
volunteers against approximately 50,000 Boers. Sufficient 
men were found by stripping the United Kingdom of regular 
troops.2 To prevent a reoccurrence of the South African 
difficulties, the Report of His Hajesty's Commissioners on 
the War in South Africa recognized that the Army would have 
to be reorganized into a striking force for imperial and 
continental use. 3 Without such a reorganization, 1914 might 
have found the British as unprepared as in 1899. 
2 
Britain's strength was in her Navy. An efficient Army 
might keep the Empire pacified,but it "'as the British Fleet 
which preserved the 'Tax Britannic~land which made Britain 
a world power. In comparison to the conscript armies of 
" " " 
France and Germany, Britain. t s Army ",as insignificant. Yet 
Britain was not cowed by continental land powers because 
she was an island. The English Channel was a protective 
moat for her as long as the Royal Navy was supreme and there 
were no means of reaching Britain but by sea. Because of 
this, the Fleet was Britain's principal offensive and de-
fensive weapon. 
Naval preeminence did not exist unchallenged. The 
"Continental" school favored a strong conscripted army to 
allO\v the option of intervening directly in European wars. 
The opposing "Blue Water" theory believed that a strong " 
navy Vias enough protection " for an island nation and that 
British troops should never again be risked in continental 
warfare. Blue Water advocates won adoption of their theory 
because it did not require conscription, odious to the 
British public since the time of Cromwell, and it allowed 
the spending of a smaller amount of the British national 
income on armaments than was true for continental powers 
supporting large armies. 4 The basic difference between the 
two schools was in their approaches to fighting a war. In 
the early eighteenth century the Continentalists managed 
3 
to have a British army committed to European action under 
Marlborough. Likewise \'Tellington led a small British army 
in Spain against Napoleon and had a large British contingent 
",lith him at Waterloo. At the same time Blue Water principles 
were adhered to as Britain used her Fleet to seize enemy 
colonies and build an empire. Wellington's army in Spain, 
it must be remembered, was originally landed and then sup-
plied by sea, and the Royal Navy attacked Napoleon indirect-
ly by establishing a blockade of France. Britain's choice 
of Blue Water strategy, then, was not based purely on eco~ 
nomic grounds but was rather a combination of these and his-
torical precedent. 
Whenever British military thinking is discussed, it must 
be viewed in the light of a preference and in fact a more 
vital need for the Navy rather than the Army. During the 
period follo~ing the Boer War the urge to reform, caused 
by incompetency in the war, must also be taken into account. 
Once this is done, a clearer understanding can be gained of 
British milit?ory thinking duri.ng the period from 1902 until 
1914. 
4 
I. THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 
The Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) was able-
through its unique structure-to examine various defence 
problems, make recommendations carrying great weight, and 
coordinate the efforts of the service departments with 
those of the rest of the government. After the war began, 
the C.l.D. ser~ed as a center for directing British effort 
and for evaluating various military alternatives. 
Three bodies preceded the C.I.D. with functions simi-
lar to those it would eventually have. The Colonial Defence 
Committee* examined and prepared land defence plans for in-
dividual colonies . but never took an overall approach to 
impe:r.ial defence. Officers from both services "-!ere members 
of the Joint Naval and Military Defence Committee in an 
effort to coordinate thinking between the two. Positive 
results failed to develop because there was virtually no 
support forthcoming from the departmental ministers. At the 
Cabinet level there was the Defence Committee. It failed to 
achieve the C.I.D.'s later success because it lacked an 
*The Colonial Defence Committee, between 1885 and. 
1892, drew up 61 colonial defence plans and made 151 indi-
vidual detailed recommenda.tions. The bulk of this work 
was incorporated in the C.I.D.'s War Book of 1911-14. From 
Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence E.l Committee: The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), pp. 20-21 . . 
adequate support structure, proper leadership, and pro-
fessional service personnel as members. 1 
As a result of the Army's poor performance against 
the Boers, the Elgin Commission was appointed to investi-
gate military defects as revealed by .the war. Its report, 
issued in July 1903, criticized "the planning, the reserve 
and manpower system, stores and supplies, and War Office 
organization. ,, 2 The report gave official impetus to the 
spirit of reform already growing since the end of the war. 
In 1902 St. John Brodrick, Secretary for War, and Lord 
Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, threatened the then 
Prime r,Unister, Arthur Balfour, with their reSignations if 
the Defence Committee was not reorganized to oversee im-
6 
perial defence. They proposed a committee to consider "those 
most difficult and important problems of all, viz.: those 
which were neither purely naval, nor purely military , nor 
purely naval and military combined~ but which may be de-
scribed as naval, military, and political. ,i 3 
Under this pressure,and seeing the need for reform him-
self, Balfour transformed the Defence Committee into the 
C.I.D. with the Colonial Defence Committee and the Joint 
Military and Naval Committee becoming subcommittees of it . 4 
The Duke of Devonshire, former chairman of the Defence 
Committe e , chaired the first meeting of the C.I.D. on 18 
December 1902. The Prime Ninister sat as an ordinary mem,... 
ber until a year later when Devo.nshire retired and Balfour 
7 
assumed the chairmanship. Membership, to be determined by 
the Prime Minister, included the ministerial and profession-
al heads of the service departments as well as their intelli-
gence chiefs. 5 A major innovation,on the Defence Committee , 
was the provision of a clerk to take minutes of meetings. 
This was a deviation from Cabinet procedure 6 and \vas to 
be the first step towards establishing a secretariat. 
The first report of the Esher Committee, set up to 
reorganize the War Office, stressed in January 1904 that 
there had been "no means for co-ordinating defence problems " 
during the war. It further said that there was no agency 
to attack these problems as a whole and to define "the 
proper functions of the various elements" making up imperial 
defence. The report concluded by recommending the forma-
tion of an agency to ensure that "peace preparations are 
carried out upon a consistent plan, and,.. . . . that, ,in 
times of emergeancy? a definite war policy upon solid data 
can be formulated.,,7 As of this time Balfour had not made 
these additions to the C.I.D.'s functions and so consequent-
ly its final form was yet to be achieved. 
Lord Esher, chairman of the committee,applied personal 
pressure for the formation of an effective C.I.D. A confi-
dant of the King,* prime ministers, cabinets , and military 
- *Admiral Sir John Fisher wrote of Esher in 1906: "You 
know he is a 'man of affairs' and is more in the hidden coun-
sels of the King and his Ninisters(and 'His r'lajesty'§. ~­
sition ' al s o!) then perhaps any man living!!! From Arthur 
authori ties-. he was able to influence important minds in 
favor of the Esher Committee's recommendations. B On 14 
February 1903 Esher wrote the King ''that the Prime r.1inister 
is a Nember but not the President of the Defence Committee; 
an arragement perhaps natural under existing circumstances, 
but which should not be taken as a precedent . ,, 9 Balfour 
was, of course, to follow this advice and become chairman . 
Esher wrote Balfour in January 1,904 on the equally vi tal 
question of a secretariat for the committee. He recommended 
that the secretary should not be a member of the C.I.D. and 
should only express an opinion when requested to do so by 
the chairman. His duties, Esher wrote: 
. . . would be to prepare material for the Prime 
Minister, collected from these sources, [the Ad:: 
miral ty and the War Office] as well as from other 
departments, in order that the · Defence Committee 
[the old name for the C.I.DJ may lay down prin-
ciples of action, which would in certain eventu-
.alities .co-ordinate the efforts of these two high 
professional offices~ 
The major innovati.on in Esher's recommendatien was that 
the committee would be informed dnissues independently by 
the secretariat before the professionals were to be called as 
witnesses. 10By this means the C-.I.D. WGuld be expert 
enough to evaluate military advice critically and there-
fore make more intelligent recommendations. 
B 
Remembering Esher's advice, Balfour created the organi-
J .. r.'Iarder, ed., Fear God and Dreadnought: ~ Correspondence 
of Admiral of th~ Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, vol. 2: 
Years of Pow~, 1904-191,gCLondon: Jonathan Cape, 1956), pp. 
107-0B. . . 
zation of the permanent C.I.D. in his famous Treasury 
Minute of 4 May 1904. Parliament approved the proposal 
later that year despite opposition by the Liberals to 
some specific points. It immediately vlon wide popularity 
among the press and public. 11 In creating the structure of 
the C. I. D. ,Balfour both drew on the advice of men like 
Esher and corrected the deficiencies demonstrated in the 
committee ' s predecessors. 
9 
The prinCiple of collective responsibility for the 
Cabinet \vas retained by making the C. I. D. advisory; decision 
making power and hence responsibility remained with the 
Cabinet. C.I.D. recommendations were influential because 
the Prime Ninister and cabinet ministers were the members 
making them. r-1ili tary professionals were included as full 
members so they could express their opinions without being 
inhibited by the.presence of the politicians. The Prime ' 
Minister, the person ultimately responsible for defence 
and war planning, \'las kept well informed on military develop-
ments via his position as chairman. 12 Flexibility of member-
ship was also an important quality of the C.I.D. Only the 
Prime IvIinister was a permanent member; the others were ap-
pointed by him and served at his pleasure. This allowed him 
to ·give temporary membership to military and civilian ex-
perts when their knowledge would add to a current committee 
investigation or discussion. As early as 1903, the Canadian 
Minister of Defence and Militia, Sir Frederick Borden, was 
10 
asked to attend several C. I .D. meetings to vlhich he added 
his views on dominion participation in imperial defence. 13 
In 1905 Esher was appointed as a special non-governmental 
14 ' member of the C.l.D., and Balfour continued as a member 
after he and the Conservatives had left otfice. 15 These 
men were able to serve because of the committee's member-
ship flexibility. The diversity of opinion thus gained was 
vital for the consideration of a_topic as broad as imperial 
defence. 
~~en' the Liberals came to power in 1906, there was 
some question as to whether the New Prime rr.inister, Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, \.,ould retain the C. I . D. Hany Liberals 
feared that the military professionals might be able to 
force through a recommendation Unpopular to ' Parliament 
which, since the, professionals were not responsible to it, 
would have to take action ag~inst the mini~ters.16 R. B. 
Haldane, future reorganizer of the Army and a supporter of 
the C.l.D., convinced Campbell-Bannerman to retain it as 
a valuable facet of the government. Nevertheless, the new 
Prime Hinister took '- lases!.' ~ ~ interest in the C. I. D. than 
had Balfour , consequently fewer meetings were held (six-
teen sessions under Campbell-Bannerman compared with sixty 
under Balfour).17 Of course it has already been explained 
that the question of ministerial responsibility brought tip 
by the Liberals in 1906 had been the reason why Balfou+ had 
only given the committ ee advisory priwer in the first place. 
u 
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Permanent subcommittees of the C.I . D. eventually in-
cluded the Colonial (changed after 1911 to Overseas) Defence 
Sub-Committee, Home Ports Defence Sub-Committee, Air Com-
mittee, and Committee on the Co-ordination of Departmental 
Action. Numerous ad-hoc committees were formed for investi-
gating issues not covered by the permanent ones. The use of 
subcommittees allowed the time necessary for the investiga-
tion and analysis of complex defence problems. 18 The s.ub-
com.rni ttee system complemented the c. I .D. ' s flexibility on 
other matters by allowing the experts on particular questions 
to study them and then report to the full C. I. D. without 
the need of wasting the latter's time with routine investi-
gative work. 
A boost came to the committee in 1908 when the efficient 
r·laurice Hankey was appointed to it· as Assistant Secretary 
and then made Secretary in 1912. He was to hold this post 
until 1938. 19 In the. year Hankey joined the C.I .D., only 
two meetings were held and no more than nine papers were 
discussed. Three years later eight meetings took place and 
over fifty papers were submitted fo r consideration. 20 · 
By 1914 subcommittees of the C.I.D. had studied such 
diverse subjects as the treatment of neutral and enemy 
shipping during \'iar, wartime food requirements of the Bri-
tish Isles, censorship, the defence of key colonial baseSt 
and war risk insurance. Besides studying military problems, 
which also received the attention of the service departments, 
the C.I.D. was able to enter into the civil and economic 
sphere where they could not. 21 Discussion and resolution 
of the invasion and conscription issues also took place in 
the C.I.D. as did the battl~ between the Continentalists 
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- and those supporting the Blue \Ilater school. Strategic 
planning, on the other hand, was initiated at the vfar Office 
and the Admiralty; they were also responsible for much of 
their own war preparation. A grave discrepancy in the re-
cord of the C.I.D. was that it failed to consider what 
administrative changes in the government would be necessary 
in time of war.22 Even so, the committee ' s contributions 
far outweigh this oversight, major though it was. 
Another C.I.D. failure came when it tried to coordinate 
activity between the War Office and the Admiralty. As early 
as 1905, Balfour had suggested that the cOIIlIhitteeshould 
take up the question of combotned operations between the two 
services,but discussions did not materialize. Subseque:p.tly, 
though, a group of officers representing both services began 
meeting informally at Whitehall Gardens to discuss the 
matter. Fisher, fearing a possible naval comm.ittment to 
Continental ideas held by the Army, collapsed the talks by 
withdrawing the naval contingent. The talks were never 
reopened. Hence a disaster like Gallipoli was certain to 
occur because of the lack of cooperation between the ser-
vices. 23 ~rhe C. I. D. did, nonetheless ~ _ provide a forum where 
military plans and information were -reviewed by committee 
13 
members representing both services. 
I~lany officers at the Admiralty and the War Office 
feared that the C.I.D. might supplant the service depart-
ments in the area of military policy making. The prestige 
received by ministers who were members of the committee was 
resented by those ,.,ho were not. Fisher's antagonism stemmed 
from his desire to keep Admiralty matters secret and also 
from his dislike for C.I.D~'s Secretary, Sir George Clarke 
(1904-07) because of Clarke's criticism of the Dreadnought. 
Fisher's sucessor as First Sea Lord, Admiral A.K. Wilson 
also opposed any C. I. D. meddling \,/i ththe planning of naval 
operations. Esher commented in 1909 that recommendations 
made by the C.I.D. were received by the services "as the 
amiable aberrations of a fevl well-meaning but harmless ama-
teur strategists." The committee's influence with the mili~ 
tary.began to grow only after the addition of Hankey, with 
his objectivity and superlative tact, as Secretary.24 
In 1905 the C.I.D. recommended the formation of a 
committee to inspect and reorganize, if necessary, the de-
fences of home and colonial naval bases. General Sir John 
Owen chaired the committee which did its ''lork, both at home 
and abroad, in 1905-06. 25 It drew up plans which were ap-
proved "for rearming the defences of the great naval bases 
at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham.".· Plans laid do\'m for 
the defences at Rosyth (see Map 1) were later revised by 
the Owen COTILrnittee's sucessor, the Home Ports Defence Sub-
· 14 
Committee. No provisions were made for defences at Cromarty 
while the Fleet's eventual wartime base, Scapa Flow, was not 
26 . considered as more than an emergeancy anchorage. Hankey 
later wrote in ~ Supreme Command, c.oncerning overseas 
bases, that because they had been designed against France 
and not Germany whose coast could easily by blockaded: "Poli .... 
tical and strategic considerations necessitated putting our 
resources into mobile ships and armies and cutting down to 
an absolute minimum our expenditure on passive defences.,,27 
This decision favored both Blue Water advocates and those 
who saw Germany as the only likely foe for Britain in the 
near future. 
The nO\-1 famous ltlar Book began in 1910 wi tha paper · sub-
mitted to the C.I.D. by the General Staff entitled "Ques-
tions Requiring Inter-Departmental consideration." A major 
complaint in the ,paper was the lack of cooperation between 
the services. Later in the year Hankey wrote a paper called 
"Co-ordin~tion of Departmental Action on the outbreak of 
War;" which dealt with the same topic. The question of cre-
ating a war book was taken up in January 1911 by a subcom-
mittee chaired by Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs. In December Esher again brought 
his influence to bear by proposing that the 1;[ar Book Sub-
Committee be made permanent; this was done soon after. The 
first printed proof of the War Book was approved in April 
1912; in December the Colonial Office notified the Dominions 
of the War Book' s existence so they could adopt a similar 
28 . system. When war carne in 1914, the War Book allovred the 
government to smoothly move onto a wart.ime footing except 
for· the Treasury ",hose war book was described by Hankey as 
being " jejune and inadequate. 1I The War Book was such a 
success that Haldane was able to write Hankey on 2 August 
1914: "The arrangements appear to me to be working out al-
most faultlessly.1I 29 
15 
Without doubt the · C.I.D. made a great contribution to . 
Britain's war readiness. If not for the War Book and the 
committee ' s other accomplishments, confusion and disorder 
might have reigned to the extent of dwarfing that of 1899. 
The advisory nature of the committee has been criticized, 
but the presence of the Prime iJiinister and cabinet ministers 
as members meant those who made the reoommendationswould 
also have the power to adopt , them. Above all, it was the 
C.I.D.'s capability to study the broad question of imperial 
defence that made it an inestimably important element of 
Britain's war preparedness and military thinking. 
I I. THE ARr·1Y 
Army reform was directly a result of its :failu:r:.es in 
the Boer War. The major innovations were an Army Council, 
a Genral Staff, Haldane ' s reorganization of the :field army, 
and the institution of new' tactics. Another important de-
velopment was the opening of staff talks with the French ' 
Army, thus drawing the nation closer to a continental com-
mitment. 
The Esher Committee, also known as The \var O:ffice 
(Reconstruction) Committee made three main recommendations 
in 1904: the formation of an Army Council similar to the 
Board of Admiralty, the creation of a Genral Staff, and the 
reorganization o:f departmental responsibilities at the 1:1ar 
Office. 1 Part of this reorganization was accomplished by 
the establishment of the C.I.D. Its other recommendations 
were adopted during 1904 which set the stage :for Haldanets 
own reform program. 
Army related policy questions were to be considered 
and decided by the Army Council. As constituted, it included 
seven members-three civilian and four military. The Civilian 
Members were the Secretary of State for War, the financial 
secretary, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary , in charge 
of all civil business other than finance. The four Nilitary 
Members had responsibilities divided into: operations and 
military policy, recruitment and dis cipline, supply and 
transport, and armaments and fortifications. 2 Assisting 
each of the members was a director. While the members con-
sidered matters of policy, the Esher Committee specified 
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that "administration will devolve upon the Direct·ors. fI It 
also advised the "appointment of Nilitary men who have not 
hitherto been connected with existing methods, and are , 
therefore, not likely to be embarrassed by the traditions 
of a system \"hich is to be radically changed. " 3 Esher wrot e 
Balfour in December 1903, stressing that the Army Council 
should "be set going at once, as a representative body, i.e. 
representative of the great branches of the" ltlar Office with 
the details of its organization being left until after its 
formation. 4 On 6 February 1904 Letters Patent instituted 
the Army Council and at the same time eliminated the post 
of CQmmander-in-Chief in order to make room for it. The 
War Office Council and Army Board was also abolished at the 
same time. 5 This was the substance of the Army Council which 
would be complimented by the creation of the General Staff . 
By an Army order , the Genral Staff was officially 
created in January 1905, but it remained a skeleton until 
the Army Council was able to define its functions and se-
lect and appoint the officers to man it . Esher complained 
of the nearly two year delay which occurred, saying that 
the Army Council had "done practically nothing" regarding 
18 
the Staff during that time. In fact, it was not until Octo .... 
ber 1906 that the new Liberal Government brought the Staff 
up to operational level. 6 Staff duties were divided between 
the Director of Military Operations, the Director of Staff 
Duties, and the Director of r1ili tary Training. The . Chief of 
the General Staff took over the responsibility of-_preparing 
the Army for war from the defunct office of Commander-:-in-
Chief. As a result of the decision by the Imperial Confer-
ence of 1907 to adopt similar military "methods and forms " 
throughout the Empire, the General Staff was renamed the 
Imperial General Staff (I.G.s.).7 The creation of the Staff 
at last provided the British Army with a body to make de-
tailed plans and studies 'of future possible operations. 
Also adopted was the Esher .Cornmittee's recommendation 
for the provision of a set of manuals. covering all aspects 
of military training and another on: more specialized sub-
jects. Guidelines \'lere set up in them for staff work from 
the highest to lowest levels. This greatly facilitated the 
rapid expansion of the Army in 1914 because officers at all 
levels understood the fundamentals of training and organizing 
an army.8 Field Service Regulations, Part I-Operations-1909 
was adopted as the field army's general manual in 1909. 
General Sir Douglas Haig, as Director of rilili tary Training 
and later Director of Staff Duties, was responsible for it 
and Part II-Organization and Administration-1909 which de-
fined and explained the "duties and ·functions of officers, 
units , and commands in the Lines of Communictions.,,9 
'dar Office departmental responsibility was di vi<;led, 
as a result of the Esher Committee ' s Report, between the 
Chief of the General · Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the 
19 
l-1aster-·General of the Ordinance. The welfare arid maintenance 
of the · troops was the responsibility of the Adjutant-General 
while the JiIaster-General of Ordinance oversaw everything. 
to do with artillery and fortifications. Above all the Esher 
Committee stressed: 
The line of cleavage between the duties of the 
several staff officers should be . • . rigorously 
preserved. It is essential to ·prevent the confu-
sion of staff arrangements which has hitherto pre-
vailed. 
It further said that military administration· should be kept 
decentralized "if the Army is to be trained and to exercise 
the in.i tiative and the independence of judgement which are 
essential in the ,field.,,10 With the completion of these 
reforms, the remaining need was for the reorganization of 
the actual field army. 
The difficulties in raising an army for use against 
the Boers dictated a reorganization of the British field 
forcetinto some sort of striking force which could be 
quickly assembled for action in either a colonial conflict 
or major European war. The need for reform did not ensure 
success as three secretaries for war and two governments 
grappled with the problem before a solution was found. Even 
then the reorganization was attacked from all sides before 
20 
it was finally adopted. . 
Brodrick, Secretary for War 1900-03, failed to re-
organize the field army because of the ambitious nature of 
his proposals. His plan was to create a force of six army 
corps. This was far too large considering the declining 
recruitment rates and the probable negative reaction of 
voters to the higher taxes which would have resulted. 
Brodrick ' s goal was to have three army corps plus a cavalry 
divison, a force of about 120,000 men, ready at a moment's 
notice for service anywhere. 11 Though Brodrick termed his 
scheme a "paper transaction," it still would have required 
the addition of 50,000 men at an increase in expenditures of 
~3 million. The total increase in Army estimates was 
estimated at ~5 million over those of the previous year . 
Joining in the debate was a rising young politician named 
Winston Churchill. He questioned the· need to have three 
army corps ready for immediate service when o~e vIas "quite 
enough to fight savages, and three not enough even to begin 
to fight Europeans.,,12 By 1903 :·Brddrick's · bluepr·irit·. was 
still just that, ~ only the First Corps at Aldershot had 
begun formation, and it dld lnot even have its brigadiers. 13 
Brodrick ' s successor at the War Office, H. O. Arnold-
Forster, also failed in his attempt to create an effective 
striking force. Arnold-Forster proposed the creation of a 
General Service Army of long term service, nine years with 
the colors and three years in the reserves; and a Home 
() 
Service Army with short term service, two years with the 
colors and six in the reserves. The General Service Army, 
approximately the same size as Brodrick 's three corps, was 
to serve as a striking force. It \vas to be composed of men 
legally old enough to serve overseas so that the reserves 
would not be eaten up replacing thosE! too young as had 
occurred in the past. The Home Service Army wp.s to' be the 
21 
c01;rnterpar't of the continent t s conscript armies , without 
conscription, and was to be available to reinforce the 
General Service Army, if necessary. Ad~inistrative districts, 
recommended by the Esher Committee, were to replace Brodrick's 
system of army corps districts for organizational and 
business purposes. One grave oversight of the plan was its 
failure to incorporate any of the auxiliary forces such as 
the militia into the system. Before Arnold-Forster's pro-
posals could be adopted, the Balfour Gove..rnment.fell. 14 
Coming to the War Office with the new Liberal Govern~ 
ment in 1906, Haldane would accomplish a completereorgani-
ztion of Bri tain-r s field forces by 1909. Haldane r s first 
move was to gather around him a group of young officers 
such as Haig and Colonel Gerald Ellison (former Secretary 
of the Esher Committee) to advise him on his reform schemes. 
He described them as "a thinking school of officers who de-
sire to see the full efficiency which comes from neVi organi-
zation and no surplus energy running to waste. 1I15 . With their 
advice, Haldanevtas ready to challenge and then reshapet.he 
the British Army. 
In order to create his desired six division Expedi-
tionary Force, Haldane had to actually reduce certain ele-
22 
ments of the Army to find men needed for more vital areas. 
His proposed reduction of the Brigade of Guards by two bat-
talions raised criticism from the , pro-military faction. 
Esher told the King that General Sir John French would 
rather give up four batteries of artillery than see the 
Guards reduced. In contrast, members of his own party like 
a Mr. Vivian called for more economy. On 9 May 1906 Vivian 
moved: "That this House of Commons is of the ' opinion that 
the growth of expenditure in armaments is excessive and 
ought to be reduced.,,16 Haldane's method of shifting men 
to fill gaps \'las the best way to achieve oath efficiency 
and economy. An example of this was his reorganization of 
the artillery. Haldane inherited more guns than gunne,rs 
because of Brodrick's expansion of the regular field artil-
lery for his six corps. Modern artillery's faster rates of 
fire required longer ammunition columns to carry the extra 
shells needed. As a result, only forty~two ' out of ninety-
three batteries in 1906 could have been manned along with 
their ammunition columns. Haldane ' s solution was simple, 
yet decisive in its results. He manned the ammunition ' 
columns with men freed by eliminating 300 guns of the IVlili-
tia Royal Garrison Artillery . 17 
On 17 July 1906 Haldane presented his proposed reforms 
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to the House of Commons. He claimed that his reforms would 
restore public confidence by making "people feel they are 
getting value for their money." Though his proposals carried 
with them considerable monetary savings, Haldane indicated 
that he had the full backing of the Army Council because 
it realized the need for economy.and would thus see to it 
that "every penny spent on the Army is spent on fighting 
efficiency." Then he went on to outline his plan for an' 
Expeditionary Force of six "great Divisions." This, con-
taining most of the regular army, was designed for overseas 
Use while other forces would be used for home defence. Total 
manpower needed for the Expeditionary Force was 150,000 men 
of vlhich 50,000 would be with their units ,70,000 would be 
reservists, and 30,000 in the militia. 18 Significantly, the 
militia was to contain no infantry and only 3,200 yeomanry 
cavalry. The remainder belonged to the artillery, the Army 
Service Corps, and the engineers of the Expeditionary Force.19 
In a Special Army Order of January 1907, the exact organi-
zation to be adopted by the Army was laid ~ut. In addition 
to the six infantry divisions there was to bea cavalrydivi-
sion, made up out of the four cavalry brigades, for use as 
an independent force. From four mounted infantry battalions 
and two cavalry regiments,two cavalry brigades were created 
to be used as a close reconnaissance force for the infantry. 
Artillery was allotted to the divisions, none being held 
bac-k as a corps reserve. 20 
( 
All this was accomplished, • and ..(2,036,000 \'las cut 
from the 1907-08 estimates, mainly due to reductions in 
infantt='y and artillery superfluous to the reorganization. 
The size of the Expeditionary Force was , said Haldane, 
"limited by the establi.shment necessary to preserve in 
order to find drafts and reliefs for the forces abroad. " 
For seven years the regular army was to remain at the size 
determined by Haldane until the necessities of war re-
quired radical expansion. 21 
· Next, Haldane turned his attention to transforming 
the auxiliary forces into a cohesive home defence force 
and reserve for the regular army. The British Army in 1898 
consisted of over a half a million men, not counting col-
onial and native troops, but they were divided up among a 
number of different organizations: 
regular armx overseas 
regular army at home 
the army reserve section "A" * 
the remainder of the army reserve 











Despite the large numbers on paper, it was found difficult 
to find even a few divisions available for South African 
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service in 1900. This was because the regular army based in 
Bri tain was an integral part of the home defence force. 111any 
*These reservists were legally capable of joining the' 
regulars without the need for a proclamation to call · them 
onto active duty. They were in their first year of reserve. 
of the auxiliary units sent in the place of regular ones 
proved to be lacking in both quality and training. 23 vfhat 
was needed, was a force of regulars for overseas duty and 
another force specifically designed for use at home. 
By Haldane '8 plan, the British Army was to consist 
of "two categories and two only." Further division, he 
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said, would "end in leaving us weak and ill organized every-
where . " He wanted an Army consisting of a "Field Force ll 
and a "Territorial" or home force. The Field Force had 
already been created by him through his Army Order and was 
"to be • ready in all respects for mobilization on the 
outbreak of a great war." The next step was to form the 
Territorials who were to be mobilized at the same time as 
the regulars but were to train for six -months before being 
called upon for the "support and expansion" of the Expedi--
tionary Force. 24 
The auxiliary forces-the volunteers, yeomanry, and 
militia--- would be transformed into fourteen infantry and 
fourteen cavalry divisions plus the . necessary support units . 
The unit organizations themselves were transferred s o that, 
except for the horse artillery, almost everyone could trace 
its origins back to either the yeomanry or volunteers . Ten 
cyclist battalions and a Territorial r'ledical Corps were -
formed at the same time . Administration was to be placed in 
the hands of the County Associations. Eac;h would be respon-
sible for recruitment, clothing, and general maintenance of 
the units under it s control. War Offices grants were made 
on the basis of how many men each association cared for. 
Training was exclusively under the control of the War . 
O'ff' 25 ' lce. 
Rather than reorganizing the auxiliary forces by Army 
Order and then having Parliament accept or reject his 
26 
estimates because of it, as had been done for thereorgani-
zation of the regulars, Haldane needed an act of Parliament. 
This was because his proposed changes would affect provi-
sions of the Army Act, the Reserve Forces Act of 1882, and 
the Reserve Forces and £1ili tia Act of 1898. In addition, the 
County Associations would need statutory authority in order 
to carry out their role of administering public . funds and 
property. Because of the economies in his earlier reforms, 
Haldane enjoyed more support from his own party; because 
of his success in increasing the Armyts ~fficiency, men 
such as Esher and Balfour were warm to his proposals. 26 
Nevertheless, the opposition he faced was strong and deep 
. rooted. General Evelyn Wood, a former Quartermaster-General, 
warned Ellison that, "If you organize the British Army, 
you'll ruin it." Liberals such as Lloyd George and Churchill 
attacked the proposals, introduced in February 1907, because 
the'",icreated too large a force while Unionists and sortle foreign 
observers considered it too small~ Other critics termed the 
Territorials a "phantom army" which would never be able to 
mobilize itself for war. When war did come, the County of 
27 
London Association, controlling more units than any other, 
was able to quickly bring all its units up to strength, 
even those thirty percent below establishment. Finally, 
there Vias opposition from diehard Tories vlho saw his reforms 
as an attack on privilege. Ellison explained that: 
Each unit had come to be regarded, in a sense, as 
the property of the Commanding Officer who con-
ceived it to be his duty to preserve intact its 
status and its financial stability. Accordingly 
the prospect 0;( drastic changes . • . \Vas far 
from popular. 2'{ 
Despite this opposition, the necessary legislation passed 
the House of Commons in June 1907 by a vote of 283 to 63. 
Haldane gave Balfour -much of the credit for its easy 
passage. In the House of Lords, the Unionist leader, Lord 
Lansdovlne , was "sympathetic and reasonable" so he too 
supported the reforms. This assured passage in the Lords . 28 
As of 1 April 1908, the old volunteer units tvere diss.olved 
with their men being given the opportunity to join the new 
Terri torials. By 1 May over 72,000 had; by 1 'J:urie 
144,620 men had been recruited out of an official·establish-
ment of 302,000. Over 100,000 men took part that year in 
the Territorials ' first summer training session and by the 
end of the year the Terri torials totalled over 207,000 men. 
One reason for this rapid filling up of the ranks was the 
high press and popular support received. As a result 1 Hal-
dane,when introducing his estimates i.n 1910, was able to 
tell Parliament that Territorial numbers had reached 88.5 
percent of establishment . 29 He had summed up his hopes for 
the Territorials when he first introduced his proposal: 
And our belief is that at the end of that time a 
period of transition . . . not only would they 
[the Territorials] be enormously more efficient 
than the Volunteers or Yeomanry forces at this 
present time, but that they would be ready, find-
ing themselves in their units, to say, "We wish 
, to go abroad and take our part in the theatre of 
war, to fight in the interests of the nation and 
for the defence of the Empire. n30 
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Unfortunately, when war came, Kitchener scrapped this whole 
system and started his ovm, one which centered on himself 
and thus ''las much like the one revolving around the Com-
mander-in-Chief which Haldane had replaced. 31 
Only a few minor changes were made in the Territorial 
system after 1908. In 1909 the Veteran Reserve, renamed 
the National Reserve, was created; it numbered 5,464 
officers and 185,372 other ranks by January 1913. The mil i -
tia was slowly dismantled by incorporating some units into 
the ~egular army and by drawing off men for the new Special 
Reserve. Only 636 men remained in the militia and 64 in the 
militia reserve as of 1913.32 Another innovation came when 
the \vard Committee recommended in 1907 the formation of an 
Officer's Training Corps. This was instituted in 1908 with 
Senior Divisions in nineteen universities and Junior Divi-
sions in 152 Public schools. The number of schools parti-
cipating steadily increased until there were 630 officers 
and 23 ,701 other ranks in the program as of 1912.33 At this 
point, Haldane's major reforms were completed. The remain-
years before the war \'fere spent by him and his successor in 
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defending the Army from critics and readying it for war. 
Conscription was avoided by the Haldane reforms because 
it would have been politically unfeasible for the anti-
militarist Liberals. This brought about criticism from 
former Commander-in-Chief and th-en President of the national 
Service League, Lord Roberts. Roberts and other conscrip-
tionisiis believed that only a large compulsory service 
army could ensure Britain's future position as a world 
power. Though he opposed Haldane's volunteer force, Roberts 
\vas not opposed to reform. He explained that: "\lie only 
differ as to the means by which that object can be ob-
tained. ,, 34 The C.I.D. examined the question of conscription 
in 1908. In spite of the argument made by Colonel Charles 
a Court Repington, military correspondent for The Times, 
that compulsory service was "indispensable in order to safe-
guard the country against invasion" and that "it would im-
prove the physique, discipline and morale of the whole na- '. 
tion," the C.I.D. found that "Universal Training" was un-
necessary. 35 
British tactical doctrine was based on the experience 
gained in the Boer War and on observation of the 1904-05 
Russo-Japanese War. Other nations also drew conclusions 
from these events. German theorists said that a future ''far 
would be decided by masses of heavy artillery which would 
be necessary to breakdown trenches and overpower the ex-
pected fierce defensive fire. The French trusted in- infantry 
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assaults clo~ely supported by light quick-firing mobile 
artillery. British experts were convinced that the avoid-
ance of rigid" doctrine . and the reliance on good field-
craft (the use of terrain to cover attacks rather than ex-
posing them to withering fire in the open) along with rapid 
and accurate rifle-fire would be the road to victory.36 . In 
1904 Esher described the men he had seen at that year!'s 
maneuvers as being full of "zeal and keenness~,,37 A foreign 
observer made note of the Army ' s tactics during the same 
maneuvers: 
In their manoeuvres the British infantry showed 
great skill in the use of ground. Their thin 
lines of khaki-clad skirmishers "'ere scarcely 
visible. No detachment was ever seen inclose 
order wi thin three thousand yards of the enemy . 
Frontal attacks were entirely avoided . ..•. ) 8 
These tactics showed great evolution from the close order 
parade ground formations which had met disaster against 
the Boer riflemen. 
This trend, however, did not carryover to the cav-
aIry. After the failure of the cavalry ' s shock tactics in 
the Boer \lIar, the lance and sword \'lere were taken out of 
use with the emphasis being put on the rifle in a mounted 
infantry role. Churchill supporiE'd the decision in Parlia-
ment when he declared that he If could not understand ho\¥ 
anyone who looked at the matter from an impartial point of 
view could possibly prefer the lance to the rifle . 1I His 
opinion was based on his experience as both an officer 
and \iar correspondent in South Africa. Nevertheless, in 
1907 the lance, absolutely useless for anything but shock 
action, was reintroduced. 39 Additional evidence- £or the 
permanent abelition of shock tactics had even been demen-
started in the Russo-Japanese ~lar where the "rifle was 
supreme." The only charges made 'I,'.Tere with the rifle, · 11 some 
very deadly. " General Sir Jehn French, who. had himself 
abandoned shock tactics in South Africa, chastised the 
Russian cavalry because, "They were devoid of real Cavalry 
training, they thought of nothing but getting off their 
. horses and shoot ing !t1.-0 Infantry manuals assessed the si tu-
ation more realistically as they advised that cavalry 
charges could be repulsed by small arms fire without the 
need to even halt an advance. 41 In 1914 mounted cavalry 
was soon relegated to . the rear areas for its O\~ protec-
tion. Unfortunately, former cavalry generals like French 
and Haig, in positions of power once the .war began, con-
tinued to make bloody infantry assaults attempting to. open 
a gap wide enough for the cavalry to exploit. Every time 
success seemed assured, the cavalry vlouldbe held up . bya 
few machineguns or other obstacles. Near the end of the 
war another kind of cavalry, tanks, were finally able to 
fill the exploitation role. 
The deplbyment of the British Expeditionary Force (B. 
E.F.) was a great source of controversy throughout the 
decade ])r:e:ced~lng the war. Bri tish commitment to a Contin-
ental strategy began with talks between the British and 
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French general staffs, but there was much opposition to 
it. Admiral Wilson suggested in 1905 that if war came with 
Germany, the Army should be used to carry out amphibious 
operations against the German coast. A \var Office study, 
done at the prompting of the Admiralty, concluded that the 
German Baltic coast was an impossible target for such an 
operation because of the existence of the German Fleet and 
the presence of impressive coastal defences;. any attack 
against the Kiel Canal, with the forces thought likely to 
be available, was also declared doomed to failure unless 
it received considerable French assistance. 42 From the \'lar 
Office point of view, this study effectively ended further 
consideration of a Blue Water strategy. 
A war game analysis, the same year , of a hypothetical 
Franco-German war convinced the General Staff that in such 
a war the British would have time to transport the B<.E.F. 
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to the battlefront . This was assuming that Britain VTould 
enter the 'var only after Belgium neutrality was violated, 
several x;eeks into the fighting, thus giving Britain pre-
paratory time. The General Staff predicted that, for fear 
of antagonizing Britain, Germany would not invade Belgium 
except as a last resort. A General Staff estimate predicted 
that the Army could have two corps in Antwerp within twenty-
two · days of a war declaration . 43 These conclusi.ons meant 
that intervention by the B. E.F. in a European war was lo-
gistically feasible. 
General Sir James Grierson, Director of lJiili tary 
Operations (D~M.O.), initiated a study in 1906 which con-
cluded that colony seizing and amphibious landings would 
have little effect on a continental war. It . declared that 
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only a combined British-French counterattack of the expected 
German invasion of Belgium could be decisive~ If Belgium 
were not invaded, British assistance should still be given 
to the French because, it said, without it Germany would 
be victorious. 44 This study was the first to consider 
assistance to France without Belgian neu4rality being vio-
lated. Clarke, C.I.D. Secretary, also advised direct aid 
to France in the event of war without an invasion of Belgium 
by Germany. A Whitehall conference on 6 January 1906 agreed 
that at the outset of a "'Tar British military cooperation 
should consist of either an expedition to Belgium or dir-
ect assistance to the French Army defending its :front,iers. 
The Admiralty representatives argued for coastal raids but 
were defeated when they could not , .gua~ante,e ;iiava:J; _:s"u.pfr:c~ority 
in the face of a German fleet trying to interfere with a 
landing. As of 9 January, Sir" Edward Grey, Foreign Secre-
tary, sanctioned the continuance of talks already started . 
with the French General Staff, but he did not yet inform 
Campbell~Bannerman of their exist.ence. 45 In mid-January 
Campbell-Bannerman also approved of the conversations. But 
before he did this, the Prime Einister had Grierson and the 
French representative, Major Huguet, make a written statement 
declaring that the discussions did not commit Britain to 
any course of action. 46 
By May the talks had produced detailed railroad time-
tables for the transport of the B.E.F . to the front once 
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it arrived in France. Information was gained which revealed 
that, :in case of invasion, the Belgians would concentrate 
their army around Brussels for the defence of Antwerp. Plans 
were laid for the B.E.F. to concentrate on the Meuse by the 
tenth day after declaring war. An inspection of the Belgian 
and French armies by Grierson found him much more impressed 
by the latter, causing him to press for joint planning vii th 
it rather than with the Belgians. During the remainder of 
1906 the Genral Staff became more and more convinced that any 
action to support Belgium would have to be made in coopera-
tion with France. Grierson's successor, General Sir Spencer 
Ewart, continued his preference for direct aid to France. 
Officially, though, no commitment h~d been made. In fact, 
in April 1907 Campbell-Bannerm~n told the French Prime r<Iini-
ster, Georges Clemenceau, that British public opinion \'1ould 
not "allow of British troops being employed on the Continent 
of Europe. 1I47 On 28 October 1908 the C.I.D. began an _inquiry 
into what government policy should be regarding a continen-
tal commitment. Its report; ratified by the entire C.I.D. on 
24 July 1909, advised that British intervention should not 
entirely hinge upon a violation of Belgian neutrality. It 
also provided for, subject to Cabinet approval, the 
concentration of' four British inf'antry dj.visions .. and one 
cavalry division on the French lef't. 48 
Little more was done until General Sir Henry Wilson 
became D.M . O. in August 1910. His calculation that the 
Germans would come through Belgium with as many as f'orty 
divisions against thirty-seven to thirty-nine French ones 
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meant that the B.E.F. could. be the edge needed f'or victory , 
especially if' all six divisions were sent. 49 General Wilson 
presented the War Of'fice ' s detailed plans to the C.I.D. in 
1911. The Admiralty representative; Admiral. A. K. Wilson 
was unprepared to off'er anything but vague alternatives to 
. 50 the War Of'f'ice plan and so it was accepted by the C.I.D. 
An agreement between General Wilson and General Dubail, 
the French Chief' of the War Ministry Staf'f, on 20 July 1911 
provided f'or, in the event of' war, the landing of' the B.E.F . 
at Le HaI.'.v~ Boulogne, and Rouen between the 4th and 12t.h days 
of' mobilization, and that it . .'.wouldthen be concentrated 
in the Maubeuge area starting on the 13th day. General Wil-
son summarized his position to Grey and Haldane as being: 
"First,\ve must join the French. Second, we must mobilize 
the same day as the Frenoh. Third, vIe must send all six 
divisions.,,51 Churchill wrote Lloyd George on 31 August 
1911 that General Wilson had inf'ormed him that if' war. 
came , British strategy would be to "move into a f'riendly 
Belgium" and to " threaten the German flank in conjunction 
with the Belgian arrny.,,52 
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All the War Office plans hinged on a British declara-
tion of war on Germany. This was up to the British Cabinet. 
Once war was declared, however, there was little room for 
variance from the War Office's plans since to do so would 
take up precious time. Britain, then, was essentially 
committed to a Continental strategy if War \Vas declared 
on Germany . 
III. THE NAVY 
Because of her island status, the Royal Navy was by 
far Britain's most basic military arm. Fisher ''las able to 
write in 1910 \1i th more than just a little justification 
that, "Comparatively, the Navy is vital and the Army is a 
play thing! ,,1 Among the duties of the British Fleet wa~ the 
protection of Britain from invasion, the defence of British 
shipping, the transport of the Army to the continent,and 
the defeat of the enemy's fleet. To accomplish these goals 
the Navy had to have a superiority at sea which would en-
sure victory with little chance of' failure,for so much de-
pended on its success. Naval superiority was the guiding 
reason for Fisher's reforms, the Anglo-G~rman naval race, 
Churchill's reforms, and the opening of discussions with 
the French for a British withdrawal from the Mediterranean 
Sea . 
Fisher became Second Sea Lord in 1902 and then First 
Sea Lord on 21 October 1904. In this position, which he 
was to hold until 1910, Fisher transfor~ed the British 
Navy, and naval warfare in general, from using saili"ng ·age 
tactics in an age of steam to one employing long range 
gunnery, torpedoes, and eventually aircraft. He \'las \"ell 
endowed with the forceful character necessary to impose 
his reforms on an unwilling Navy. Fisher once described 
himself as: "I entered the navy penniless, friendless and 
forlorn. I have had to fight like hel~ and fighting like 
hell has made me what I am. ,,2 Obviously a man l .ike this 
would not shrink from imposing unpopular reforms if he 
thought them necessary. 
Personnel reform began \vith the Selborne Scheme of 
1902 , launched in 1903-05. It made officer training uni-
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form for the three naval branches-executive, engineering, 
and marine-until men became lieutenants (at about age 22) 
when they would be allowed to specialize in one of the 
three areas. Upon attaining the rank of commande.r, the 
specialty was to be dropped unless the individual had no 
wish to command a. ship. Many officers did reach high rank 
by remaining with an engineering or marine specialty. The 
Selborne Scheme was instituted because under the former , 
system of separate training for each branch esprit de corps 
had suffered as the excuti ve branch*" had considered itself 
superior to the others. Marine officers had had few ship-
board duties and so felt out of place until the Selborne 
Scheme gave them the basic training necessary to run a 
ship and to understand what was going on. Executive officers, 
on the other hand, learned what propelled a ship. \vhile 
engineers were educated in how to fight one . Henoe officers 
of the three branches became somewhat interchangeable and 
·~In charge of navigation, gunnery, and torpedoes. From 
Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flo~, pp. 28-30. 
made officers of each branch more sympathetic to the prob-
lems of the other specialties. 
Admiral Charles Beresford, commenting on the situa-
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tion previous to the Selborne Scheme, declared: "In 20 years 
time Naval Officers will wonder how a steam navy could 
possibly have been run and administered by an executive 
who knew nothing vrhatever about steam or mechanical appli-
ances . 1I 3 Indeed, it also seems unlikely that such officers 
could have got t en the most out of their ships. This, in an 
age when technology was invading warfare more and more, 
i . e . bigger and more powerful ships. 
Better o.f:ficers "'Iere needed to man these more soph:i-
ticated ships,but at the same time many potential officer 
candidates were excluded from the service because of the 
high cost of naval education. In fact, only 1i million out 
of B~itain's total population of 43 million could afford it. 
There was also opposition from the Dfficer-class to the 
recruitment of the lower classes as officers. The Naval and 
Military Record echoed this sentiment in 1910 with: "We 
should view with grave apprehension any attempt to officer 
the fleet at all largely \vi th men of humble birth. It Fisher 
attacked the existing system on the grounds that it contra-
dicted Britain.' s democratic principles and because it · 
wasted potential naval genius. Horatio Nelson, after all, 
woul d have been excluded by the turn-of-the-century system. 
]'isher strove to have all fees abolished at the Naval Colleges 
of Osborne and Dartmouth. Though not abolished entirely 
until 1947, they were reduced 50 percent in 1913 under 
Churchill for one-quarter of the entrants of \,lhich three-
f~fths · were to be . the sons of needy parents. 4 . 
Another Fisher reform came in the much neglected area 
of training for high level officers. He managed to have 
instituted in 1900 a War Course. It had as part of its 
curriculum the study of naval history, strategy, tactics, 
and international law. Officers were selected for it by 
appointment, making the course mandatory and providing 
full pay unlike the previous voluntary courses vlhere 
officers served on half-pay. In 1903 the original eight 
month course was divided into two four month sections. 
They were expanded in 1908 to include the examination of 
problems sent to them by the Director of Naval Intelli-
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gence. The War Course, originated by Fisher, has continued 
in one form or another to the present day though its name 
has changed. 5 This was an important step toward a more 
logical and systematic approach to the study of ·naval war, 
but at this point Fisher failed to take the next vital step 
of establishing a naval staff. 
The system of reserves was altered so that they would 
be more capable of manning the Fleet when the need arose. 
IvIerchant seamen and fishermen were trained in modern ships 
at sea rather than, as they had been, in shore batteries 
and harbor hulks. In order to keep a hold on experienced 
;-
men, the Royal Fleet Reserve \'las f'ormed of' men leaving the 
Navy. Amateur seamen such as yachtsmen were incorporated 
into the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, f'ormed in· 1903. 
Boys, who had previously been trained on rigged training 
vessels, were now trained in land schools, in n.ucleus-
cre\'led vessels, and in armored cruisers . 6 These changes 
brought the reserves into contact with up to date f'ighting 
methods. 
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As Commander-in-Chief of' the r.o1edi terranean Fleet (1 899-
1902), Fisher had f'ought f'or earlier promotions, arguing 
that "The increasing average age of' our Admirals is appalling! 
In a f'ew years you'll see them all going about with gouty · 
shoes and hot water bottles!" A committee under Lord Goschen 
was set up to study the promotion problem. Byanorder-in-
council of' 1903, its recommendations were adopted. They 
redu(fed the minimum age limits f'or high level officers by 
three to f'ive years and lmvered the retirement age by two 
to three years so that the youngest captains would average 
36 t o 37 years of' age, rear admirals 41 years,and vice 
admirals 52 years. 7 
Fisher ' s concern f'or the welfare of the "Lower Deck" 
increased naval morale. Rations "/ere improved through the 
provision of' shipboard bakeries to replace "hard tack" and 
seamen were finally allowed the simple luxury of' using 
knives and f'orks to eat with. Cruel and brutal punishments 
were f'orbidden; pay and the chances of promotion were 
increased. 8 These simple reforms, by Fisher, made naval 
life more attractive so that a better quality of man would 
be willing to serve in the Fleet. 
Turning to materiel, ]'isher first reorganized the 
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ship reserve system then went on to change the materie'l i t-
self. Under the old system there had been two reserves--
the Fleet Reserve containing ships ready for mobilization 
or commission but not immediately needed and the Dockyard 
Reserve consisting of obsolete ships needing considerable 
time to ready for service and not likely to be used except 
in an emergen,cy. ,To replace this, Fisher introduced his 
nucleus-crew system whereby the ships of the Fleet Reserve 
were to be manned by two-fifths of their required crews, 
including all the specialists and officers· needed for bat-
tle. The ships took practice crui~es so their crews could 
familiarize themselves ""i th the handling an.d qualities of 
each ship. The ships were'organized-into three reserve 
divisions which operated together as units for 10-14 days 
a year and so'were capable of joining in fleet actions 
without great difficulty. Upon mobilization, the Fleet 
Reserve could be brought up to strength quickly by filling 
out the crews with men from onshore barracks and the in-
structional establishments. Balfour said in 1906 that "this 
new Reserve scheme has augmented the fighting power of the 
British fleet not once or twice, but threefold. " Fisher, 
himself, called it li the keystone of our preparedness for 
war" because it meant that the whole sea-go ing fleet viaS 
" instantly ready for war. 1I9 
Fisher found men for his nucleus-crew system by 
scrapping many of the obsolete ships Britain had main-
tained in the far corners of the globe for little more 
reason than "showing the flag." lJIost of . these ships were 
either- \'looden with masts and rigging , had muzzle loading 
guns, or were protected with armor plating too thin to 
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stop a modern proj ectile. A special committee was appointed 
to investigate the si tuati.on. As a result, 154 ships were 
struck off the effective list. Fisher calnulated the 
savings at ,,(845,000 per year on repairs alone. 1 0 When an 
earthquake occurred in 1907 in Jamaica, United states re-
lief vessels arrived first because of Fisher's reductions. 
This caused a public outcry against Fisher t s program be-
cause it seemed to r educe British prestige. Fis.her r~sponded: 
. I see the Globe has a leading article attack-
ing the Admiralty for not having an ambulance corps 
of cruisers and . gunboats distributed over the 
earthquake area of the globe! The Navy Estimates 
would be a hundred millions if everyone had every~ 
thing!11 
The costs of keeping a naval presence in strength every-
where would have weakened British efforts against the 
German challenge and . would probably have ban.l{:rupted her. 
To face the German threat, Fisher introduced the prin-
ciple of concentrating the Fleet in home waters (around the 
British Isles ) during wartime and having it close by whil e 
peace prevailed. Under the former distribution of fl ee ts , 
the Hediterranean Fleet consisted of "twelve battlesh.:lps, 
the Channel Fleet (not always in the Channel) eight, "and 
th~ Home Fleet eight of the older battleships.· Fisher 
brought the Home, renamed the Channel Fleet, up to seven-
teen battleships by adding four withdrawn from the I'Iedi-
terranean and five from the China station .. The Channel 
Fleet was renamed the Atlantic Fleet and vIas to contain 
eight of the newest battleships. Based at Gibraltar, it 
was able to reinforce quickly either the Mediterranean 
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or Channel Fleets if necessary. 12 In a letter of 24 January 
1907, Fisher boasted that these moves had allowed for the 
manning of 12 battleships and armored cruisers, 48 destroyers 
with all attendant auxiliary vessels, and a 25 percent in-
crease in the size of the nucleus-crew system. 13 .Even if 
Fisher's figures were exaggerated, the redistributiori of 
the fleets put Britain's strength in northern European 
waters, where it was being chall.enged. 
BritaiJ;1 ' s huge preponderance of battleships gave her 
a wide edge over Germany as long as technology did notcQwe 
up with a new \veapon to make it worthless. Fisher vlaS de-
termined to see that Germany would. not befirst:t.Q! C0me up with 
such a development by coming up with one himself. Before 
becoming First Sea Lord, he recognize.d the need for a 
change in battleship design. His Flag-Captain at Portsmouth, 
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, recorded him saying that gunnery 
ranges would have to increase to keep up with the progress 
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being made in torpedoes. Fisher indicated that the Russians 
had torpedoes that could hit from 3 ,000 yards at 24 knots 
and "soon it will be 5,000 yards, and then where i s your 
gunnery going tobe?1I 14 It was true .that prior to 1903, -
gunnery ranges averaged about 3,000 yards . Prornpted by 
some French and Italian successes at lengthening this 
range, the British Navy began its own tests which showed 
in 1898 that future ranges were likely to be at around 
5-6,000 yards . At that distance the range could only be 
determined by observing the splashes of salvoes of at 
least four shells and preferably more. This could only be 
accomplished by ships having a number of guns of the same 
calibre, making the installation of multi-sized guns obso-
lete. Admiral Bacon commented in his biography of Fisher 
that lIit was evident that our future battleships should be 
armed primarily :"i th a sufficiency of guns of one uniform 
size. ,,15 Thus the need to build a ship with guns of the ' 
same size was evident to Fisher. The question, though, still 
remained, what would it s designind.lude:? 
Designs for the first ."all-big-gun" battleship as 
well as for the first battle cruiser were drawn up under 
Fisher while he was stationed at Portsmouth a.s Second Sea 
Lord. W. H. Gard, the Chief Constructor at Portsmouth, 
advised on questions relating to the hull, weights, and 
displacement. The Managing Director of the Fairfield Ship-
building and Engineering Company, Alexander Gracie, supplied 
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information on the boilers and machi!lery. Various naval 
officers suggested armament schemes. The designs were 
almost complete. when Fisher bacame First Sea Lord in Octo-
ber 1904. 16 According to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1919 the 
designs called for: 
a battleship with 12 12-inch guns arranged in 
pairs along centre line; three pairs of guns at 
bOv/s', thre e stern, the inner barbettes rising in 
tiers, so that six guns could fire ahead, six 
astern , and all twelve on broadside. 
A commission set up to study the designs scaled them down 
to a ship carrying e ight guns, "two forv/ard, two aft, ·two 
on each . beam. II A fifth turret was later added "because it 
happened to fitll17 (see figure t) . 
Fisher unveiled his creation, the Dreadnought, early 
in 1906. She was "larger, faster, and more powerful " than 
any other battleship in existence. At 21 knots, the Dread-
noug~t was 2 knots faster than any other battleship afloat 
and carried ten 12-inch guns in comparison to the four 
12-inch and four 9. 2-inch guns . of the last "pre-dreadnoughts" 
except for the "Lord Nelson" class which had four 12-inch 
and ten 9.2-inch guns. In weight of broadside, the TIread-
nought fired 6 , 800 pounds compared to 4;160 pounds for the 
"King Edward II class. of pre-dreadnoughts and 5,300 pO\l1lds 
for the "Lord Nelsons. " Design success is readily apparent 
from the fact that every capital ship since the Dreadnought 
has had a primary armament of eight to twelve large guns ' of 
a single calibre. Secondary armament was eliminated except 
47 
DREADNOUGHT (February, 19(6). 
NDrma! displacement, 11,900 tons. Full load, about 20;700 tons. Compialnent, a6:!. . 
{
Maximum draught, 31 feet. }Le· gth ( ) 5"6 I (p 4n Of ) Length (,r.l), 520 !eet. Beam, 82 feet. Mean .. 26},,· n, 0.0. -) eet .p. " cet. 
Guns: Armour (R.C.) : 
10 ...... 012 inch, 45 CIl!. } n' Con· f 11"-9' Lower belt .•.•• 
10--12 pelr. 1r.. , 8' Upper belt,! ....•.•• 
2-,.-3 inch (anti-aircraft, 13 Armour (K.N.C.) : ! ll"' Bulkhead (aft) ...• 
pdr.) J t" Main (forward) ••• -.,..; 6" Belt (bow) .•.•. - •. 
2-12 pdr. (anti-aircraft) Ji Ii" (nat) Middle •.••• ,.§ 4: Be~t (stern) . _ •.••• 
4-3 pdr. ~ 2!," (slope) (amidships) ; ~ -< 11 .. -.8 ;narbettel< .•••. 
5 M.G. ~.t 4" at en.dS (Middle) " .• r:::..1 12 .. Gunnouse~" •.... •. . 
(1 landing) 3'_1" Lower I 11 Fore C.T .•..•.•• .. 
Torpedo tubes (IS inch) : Specia.l protecti~~::::: 5; Fore.com. tube •••• 
4 8ubmerged (8roadside) .. Screens to Mags., &0. 8 .. After.C.T. i •••• ••• . 
. 4 After ~om, tuhe • •. 
Ahead: 
4 to 6 ...... 
It in. Broadside i 8-12 in., 1-:18 in. tube. 
Machinery: Pa.rsons turbine. 4 screVl"S. Boilers: 1.8- Babcock & 'Vilaox in 3 groups. 
Designed H.P, 23,000 = 21 I,ts. Coal: normal, 900 tons; maxi?lwm, 2900 tons + 1120 tons oil 
+ 120 tons pat!'nt fuel. Nominal radius: 6600 at 10 kts.; 5000 at 19 kts. 
Torpedo Notu.-Stcrn tll~ removed during War. 
Enqineerill(! NOUR.-}'1I11 power. 400 re\·olution~.· One H.P. ahead, onc H.P. (:8tern turbine on cach wing shaft: Inner 
shafu., 3 turbine!> each (cruising L.P. ahead:. I •. P. astern). 1 nstern tl1rblni:> on each. Boilerpres..urc: 2:'01bs., 
reduced slightly at. the turbines. Earh turblll(, has 39.600 hladeij .. l\lain condensers: 26,000 square feet; auxUlarr: 
6000. Gmt .... Filrfac~: 1599 square feet. Heating surface: 5:;.400 square il't't. On trials sbe cx~eded her Ifpced 
for short spurt·s (best mile at. 21.78). hut barely uwraged it on her eight. hOUl·.' run, V~rr free from vibrution. 
Weight of machinery; main and auxiliar)', j)73~ t()U~ + water = 189'f ton~. 
CODl cOlillUmplioll.-Very economical at full speed. abouf 340 ton'· per (lIw for full power. At, slow fipeE'd cOllsumptioQ 
is heavy. At 46()O lLP. (I3 kts.) it, averages Jl('arl)' 160 tons a da):. At· 10.000 H.P., about 2.W rons per da)', 
.Armollr Noles.-Bo.:;C! of I1mlrl>;hipl< bnrb~tt{'s is 8" only nnclali barbettc baS(l~ S" behhld belt. Protective deck aft Is· 2" 
flat, 3" on slope" lind over steering g(,lIr. Internal screens to magazines, &;t'., arc not con'timw1;lS between emi 
ba;;.bettc •. 
rAid. Cum. TrieU (mean). Na.me. BuiU at MachiM11/ 1>11 Boiler., d(.th& pleted 3fJ 1m. nI16,250. 8 h'TS. fu1J.. 
.~ ---!- -
DreadnOU{lhl Portsmouth Vickers D£e~ '05j"0eL '06 16,930 .. 19'3 24,712" 2()'9t B:lbcoc:-k 
• Was no~ really complete lOt this date. ]o'1rst conunll!5ion ool;:an Voe., 1006. £262.500 was sp .. mt In fini3hing her 








12 in. ! 
Fig. 1. From Surgeon-Lieutenant R. 
Prendergast, eds., Jane'~ Fighting 
Marston, 1919; reprint ed., Newton 
David &. Charles, Publishers, Ltd., 
N. Parkes and Maurice 
Ships, 1919 (Sampson Low 
Abbot Devoh, England: 
1969), p. 60. 
for twenty-seven 12-pounders designed to repel torpedo 
attack. 18 The DreadnOUghtl~~~~~ulted from Fisher's inno-
vation of using turbine engines rather than the then 
standard reciprocating engines. Turbines transformed the 
engine room from a hell of noise and water (needed to cool 
the engines) into a clean and dry place with only a hum 
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to indicate engine operation. More important than the 
physical improvements for the crew, was the improved per-
formance of the ship. Tests had ~ho"m that pre-dreadnoughts 
could achieve a top speed of only 14 knots, then only if 
the captain \'las willing to have the ship I s engines · over-
hauled afterwards. Even cruisers had trouble operating over 
long distances at 18t knots ,without having serious engine 
damage . The Dreadnought, however, was able to sail from 
England to Trinidad and back at an average speed of 17i 
knots without any repairs whatsoever being needed. 19 
Because of the radical innovations introduced by the 
Dreadnought, criticism was to be expected. Its large size, 
and consequent greater cost, was attacked because this 
meant fewer ships could be built. With fewer ships, . the 
critics claimed that the loss of even one would be a severe 
blow. The Admiralty refuted this claim by explaining: 
For the increase of 1,500 tons of displacement 
over the "Lord Nelson»" class we have obtained 
a much more powerful armament, a nearly equal 
main protection, a vastly superior se~ondary 
protectionA and a greatly increased sea-keep-
ing power . .c:O 
Size was certainly not a handicap to the Dreadnought as 
the trend would. be to even larger and more powerf'ul ships; 
the HQueen Elizabeth" class would be the peak of prew'ar 
design in this area. 
The all-big-gun concept was also attacked, but the 
larger calibre gun proved itself even more accurate than 
its smaller calibre counterparts during a series of tests 
held in 1905. At 6,000 yards the percentages_of hits to 
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rounds fired were: 12-inch, 37 percent; 9.2-inch, 25 percent; 
and 6-inch, 15 percent. The comparative effect of the · 
larger shell bursting within a target ship was estimated 
at 70 to 1 in favor of the 12-inch gun. In target battle 
practice the Dreadnought fired 75 percent more weight of 
shell in ten minutes (21,250 pounds) than any other battle-
ship. One proven deficiency was found in the ,12-pound guns 
whicl}. became ineffective once torpedo range was increased 
to 7,000 yards. Future "dreadnoughts" received 4-inch guns 
as secondary armament until the 1911-12 program when 6-inch 
guns were introduced for this purpose. 21 
Complementary to the development of the al1-':big-gun 
ship \'laS the appointment by Fisher of Rear Admiral Percy 
Scott in 1905 as the Navy's first Inspector of Target 
PrQctice. Within two years Scott doubled the Fleet's sh6ot-
ing' accuracy through his method of training by const~~t 
practice instead of reading about it~ut of books." The 
rate of fire also increased as a result of his invention 
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of the loading tray, dotter, and deflection teacher . Battle 
target practice was set at 5-7,000 yards with the target 
being a fixed 90 by 30 foot screen fired at by the ship's 
cruising at 15 knots. By 1907 the target itself was towed 
for increased realism. As of 1908 most ships had better 
accuracy at 6-7,000 yards then they had .hadat ·2,000 yards 
only a few years earlier. Out of 100 shots in 1898, 69 were 
misses; in 1907, at the longer ranges, only 21 shots missed 
out of every 100. 22 Though some of this improved accuracy 
could have been achieved vii th pre-dreadnoughts tit \<las the 
dreadnoughts which took advantage of this improvement most 
by delivery more weigh~ of shell for every hit. 
If the Dreadnought's offensive capa.bilities \'lere suf-
ficient, the critics charged ther.e . must be defensive flaws o. 
Indeed the Dreadnought did sacrifice armor in order to ob-
tain extra speed, but this was a calculated risk. A paper 
submitted to the Admiralty Board in 1906 concluded that t .he 
decisive Japanese victory at Tsushimaduring the Russo-
Japanese War was won because the Japanese Fleet had been 
able to use greate.r· speed to take and then maintain a 
superior position: 
Had they not possessed superior speed, the Jap-
anese would rapidly have lost this advantage • . • 
their greater spee'd enabled the Japanese to main-
tain their advantage and so continue the concen-
tration of fire on the Russian van until so much 
damage had been inflicted · that the Russians lost 
all order and were crushed. 23 
It was logical to . conclude. that as long as armor. was 
adequate, any extra would be purely defensive while more 
speed "'JOuld add to the ship's capabil ty of carrying the 
offensive to the enemy, which was the Fleet ' s main purpose. 
One last major criticism of the Dreadnought was that 
by making all existing battleships obsolete, Britain's 
preponderance of pre-dreadnoughts was also obsolete. Each 
nation was thus starting from scratch in 1906. The Admir-
alty countered this argument by pointing out that other 
nations had not been blind to the advantages of an all-
big-gun ship and that one of these might have gotten a 
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big lead by producing such a ship in se.crethad not Britain 
built the Dreadnought first. 24 
Included in the 1905-06 program was the world's first 
battle-cruiser, Invincible. She was designed to carry eight 
12-inch guns and had a top speed' of 25 knots. Since she had 
to sacrifice armor for speed, the Invincible only had the 
armor protection of the "l'linotaur" class of armored cruiser. 
However, this should not be seen as a defect of the battle-
cruiser for it was not supposed to fight battleships. Rather, 
its raison d'etre was to be fast enough to hunt down and 
powerful enough to destroy commerce raiders, act as a fast 
wing or van of the Fleet, and be a strong ·reconnaissance 
force. 25 Problems would arise only when the battle-cruisers 
were to do what they were not designed for i. e. fight 
battleships. 
At the same time as Fisher was improving the quality 
of the Fleet, he was looking for ways to economize . His 
greatest financial achievement was the formation of the 
Estimates Committee. Composed of the financial authorities 
at the Admiralty, with Fisher as chairman, it ruthlessly 
examined requests for funds, reducing or discarding those 
not meeting its approval. A net decrease of~3.5 million 
was achieved in the estimates presented to Parliament for 
1905-06. 26 
Fisher's legacy was a Navy much improved over the one 
he had found, but more important, he laid the foundations 
in personnel and materiel upon which later reforms ' were 
built. Fisher summed up his accomplishments in 1907: 
\ve have built the Dreadnought; we have stopped 
all foreign shipbuilding for 16 months; we 
have successfully adopted the turbine, and 'VIe 
have reduced Naval Estimates by 5 millions 
(and shall reduce them still more!), while the 
Navy is incomparably stronger and more ready for 
fighting than it was two years ago .. Our Fleets 
are 50 percent more at sea, and we hit the tar- · 
get 50 percent more than we did two years ago. 27 
From 1898 until the beginning of the war, Britain and 
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Germany fought a race for naval supremacy. The German naval 
laws of 1898 and 1900 began a construction project which 
was to have completed 32 battleships by 1920. Between '1900 
and 1905 she laid down the keels of 12 battleships, prompt -
ing expert British opinion to predict that Germany\'lOuld be 
the world ' s second leading naval power by 1906. As early as 
1902, Lord Selborne had warned in a Cabinet paper that the 
German Fleet was designed for a contest with Britain. 28 
Nevertheless, Britain did not strongly r.eact to the German 
challenge until King Edv{ard VII ·-'s v1si t to Riel in 1904. 
During the visit, Wilhelm II showed off Gerinan naval 
strength and by doing so stimulated the Royal Navy to 
action. He further stimulated it by his assertion the 
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same year that he was "Admiral of the Atlantic." The growing 
German challenge was why Fisher redistributed the Fleet. 
Part of this redistribution was made possible by a treaty 
with Japan which protected British Far East interests. 
Also in 1904, Britain made her entente cordial.e vl.ith France 
official,and agreement was reached with Russia during 1906-
08 after the Russo-Japanese War had ended. 29 \vith the United 
States also considered friendly, there remained Ohly Germany 
to be a possible naval threat. 
The 1898-1905 period of the race proved to be a failure 
for Germany because of her inexperience in building, ,the · 
constraints of the Riel Canal (a large battleship could not 
pass through it), and the superiority o.f the British ships 
themselves. Expert opinion considered German ships of this 
period to be markedly inferior to those of Britain. 30 Then, 
of course, Fisher built the Dreadnought and the race was 
restarted vlith the disappearance of the vast British pre-
dreadnought superiority into obsolescence. Germany ' s first 
dreadnought, the Nassau was laid down in 1906. 31 
German moves convinced many that she was Britain's 
only possible opposition on the seas. In 1906 Fisher wrote 
Tweedmouth, the new Liberal First Lord, that "Germany is 
our only possible foe for years to come ! ,,32 Asquith wrote 
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in 1909 that .there was no reason for Germany to build a 
fleet~nless for aggressive purposes, and primarily against 
ourselves. " Grey in 1908 pointed out the difference bet\"/een 
the German and British fleets as the following: 
If the German Fleet ever becomes superior to ours, 
the German Army can conquer this country. There is 
no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany; for 
however superior our Fleet was, no Naval [Sic~ "" 
victory v{Quld bring us any nearer to Berlin." 3 
Even the design of the German Fleet revealed a challenge 
to Britain since it was built so cramped and with such a 
small fuel reserve that it w·as only fit for use in the 
Baltic o~ North Sea. Since Bussia was still recovering 
from her losses to the Japanese " and the French Navy was 
small in comparison to the German Fleet , Germany could bnly 
be building such a large fleet for a 'challenge to British 
naval supremacy.34 Coupled with the reasons already pre-
sented, this provoked a strong British desire to keep 
a safe margin over the German Fleet to ensure victory in 
any contest between the two. 
Despite the fact that Germany appeared to be the only 
immediate threat, those in favor of a strong Navy argued 
that Britain should build against a two power standard 
(any possible combination of two navies) plus 10 percent. 
Fisher explained that the Board of the Admiralty could not 
just build against the enemy of the moment because they 
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"are the trustees of future generations of their COUJltrymen, 
who may not enjoy the same comparatively serene sky as our-
selves. 1I 35 In other \<lords,Britain had to be prepared to 
meet a combination of powers, which though unlikely in the 
near future, could nevertheless develop. 
British naval construction vTaS set at four dreadnoughts 
(battleships or battle-cruisers) per year in 1905 by the 
"Cawdor IVlemorandum" before the Conservative Government 
under Balfour left office. The incoming Liberals like 
Campbell-Bannerman and Lloyd George were politically com-
mitted to a program of less spending on armaments so one 
ship ViaS cut from the 19061-07 estimates and two:fromthe 
1907-08 unless the upcoming Hague Conference failed to slow 
36 the naval race. At the 1907 conference, German Admiral o;f 
the Fleet, Alfred von Tirpitz rejected Brit,ish overtures 
o:f naval reductions as being unacceptable to the German 
public: 
Here is England, already more than :four times as 
strong as Germany, in alliance with Japan, and 
probably so with France, and you, the colossus, 
come and ask Germany, the pygmy, to disarm. 3"' 
There:fore the Liberal Government laid down three battle-
ships in their 1907-08 program compared to Germany ' s two 
battleships and one battlecruiser, their :first. 38" 
Then, the German Reichstag upset the situation even 
more by amending the 1900 Navy Law in 1908 to the effect 
that from 1908-09 to 1911-12 Germany would lay down four 
dreadnoughts per year, three battleships and one battle...:. 
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cruiser. Even so, the Admiralty only requested funding;t'or 
one battleship, one battle-cruiser 1 sixteen destroyers, and 
~500,000 for submarines in the 1908-09 estimates. This pro-
jected Britain having seven battleships and four battle-
cruisers against Germany's predicted three and one,respec-
tively, by 1910. 39 As a result of German construction 
acceleration and the Liberal unwillingness to make a major 
increase in British naval spending, the "two power, plus 
10 percent" standard was replaced by one of· "60% above 
German strength in every class of vessels." Even Admiral 
Sir John ·Jellicoe, future commander of the Grand Fleet, 
agreed that the old standard had not been correct. 40 This 
apparent s-lackeiting of the race was not to last however. The 
new standard did, though, represent a decrease in the num-
ber of ships Britain was committed to build. 
The Admiralty asked fOr ,six dreadnoughts in the 1910-11 
estimates to match Germany's expected four and Austria's 
two. A compromise was reached by which Britain \,/as to have 
five ships each in the 1910-11 and 1911-12 programs. With 
the estimat~s topping £40 million, the Royal Navy was to 
have 25 dreadnoughts by rllarch 1913 plus 2. battle-cruisers 
promised by New Zealand and Australia compared \'1i th a pro-
jected figure of 17 for Germany and 2 Austrian. The figures 
for German strength were based on the assumption that Ger-
many's program would continue at the 1909 rate. 41 
Another attempt was made at naval limitation talks 
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in 1909, but the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg 's sti-
pulation that an agreement be made to "exclude all possi-
bility of' attack by one party on the other" as Germany's 
price for naval limitation, resuI.tedl in an impasse. Talks, 
nevertheless did proceed on other issue.s, such as exchange 
of building timetable information and dockyard inspectio~s~2 
Grey commented in 1909 that Germany claimed her naval pro-
gram was based on the naval la\'ls passed by the Reichstag 
in 1898 and 1900 and amended in 1908 rather than against 
British building, "therefore there appeared to be no open-
ing for' negotiations. II He was also alarmed by public.lec-
tures in Berlin that discussed the possibility of'invading 
England. 43 All f'urther hope for naval reductions was soon 
destroyed by 'a German move in Norocco. 
The Agadir Crisis resulted f'rom Germany sending a gun-
boat, the Panther, on 1 July 1911 to MorQccoin support of' 
her African interests. This was the third s erious crisis 
since 1905. The others had also involved an assertion of' . 
~ermany's right to confer with other nations on major di-
plomatic matters. The German view of the Agadir Crisis ' was 
that since French absorption of Morocco seemed inevitable, 
France should be made to compensate ,Germany f'or the loss of' 
her interests in the area. The British Government suspected 
that this compensation would include a large chunk of the 
French Congo and a naval base :on f.Ioroc.co's Atlantic coast; 
the Germans were already negotiating with local chic:ftainr.; 
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on this latter point. 44 In the world of skilled professional 
diplomacy, the German action was viewed as an irresponsibly 
provocative act. I'-'Iany who had opposed British armaments 
changed sides once German aggression was so clearly demon-
strated. Churchill, a long time foe of naval spending, . 
\'Irote · in an undated 1911 letter that German "action at Agadir 
has put her in the wrong & forced us to consider her claims 
in the light of her policy & methods."Re even advocated 
joining France if a war was- to break out bet\'Ieen the two 
unless the French had taken a stand On "unjustifiable 
ground.,,45 On 21 July 1911 Lloyd George delivered his 
famous Mansion Rouse speech in which he condemned German 
actions and called on Britain to prevent "a disturbance of 
international peace. " If Germany remained intractable"and 
if peace could only be retained by Britain losing her place 
" in the Cabinet of· nations," he declared that "then L say 
emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation 
intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. 1I46 Sur""'; 
prisingly, a German base in Norocco was of little concern 
to the Admiralty because they felt that it could be easily 
isolated and captured during the first few \'leeks of a war. 47 
Another consequence of the Agadir Crisis was the rene\'lal 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 48 British reaction was, as 
Churchill had said, to Germany ' s means of action rather than 
to her demands, themselves. Agadir impelled the British to 
face the possibility, much more closely, of an ultimate 
conflict \"i th Germany. 
It became knm'ffi in London in early 1912 that Germany 
was considering a new naval law which "Iould acerbate the 
naval race even more. Worse than additional construction t 
was the provision to keep the German High Sea Fleet on 
permanent mobilization. Adoption of permanent mobilization 
by the Royal Navy\vould have cost Britain an additional 
£3 million per yea~ plus it would have necessitated the 
concentration of the entire Fleet in home waters. 49 Chur-
chill, as First Lord, stated that any German increase in 
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construction would be met "2 keels to 1." In addition, he 
said that a German fleet always in full commission Ifexposes 
us to constant danger only to be warded of'f' by vigilance 
approximating to war conditions." · By his calculations, the 
Royal Navy had to have a clear superiority in ships, 'J?eady 
to meet a German f'leet in battle at 24 hourIs notice. 50 
The last ef'fort to slow the naval race took place at 
this time with Haldane's mission to Germany. · Continued 
Germany insistence on British neutrality in a continental 
war and Tirpitz's proposal for a 3:2 ratio between the 
British and German navies made agreement impossible. Grey 
refused to continue talks after this because he feared they 
might have jeopardized his agreements vii th France. 51 The 
stage was now set for the last leg of' the race, the one to 
war. 
Churchill's 191 2-13 estimates began a program which 
would alternate between :four and three dreadnoughts per 
year. Hence, it would run 4-3-4-3-4-3 agatnst the original 
German plan of two ships a year . The new German program, 
however, provided :for a program o:f 2-3-2"':2,.... 3~2 .0 To keep 
the " 60 percent" • standard in force, ·Churchill proposed a 
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new program of 4-5-4-4-4~4 (the first year's figure included 
the donation of a battleship :from the Federated Malay States). 
It was Churchill ' s opinion that continued British building 
would eventually dishearten German ef:forts. 52 Churchill also 
introduced a new standard whereby though an overall "60· percen1J' 
margin would still be kept, in .home waters he declared that 
a "50 percent margin" was enough. 53 Tirpitz suggested in 
February 1913 that a British:German ratio o:f 8:5 was accept-
able to him, but Grey rejected the o:ffer because of the 
continued building of Austria and Italy as \vel1 as because 
"what Tirpitz said does not amount to much , and the reason 
:for his saying it is not the love of our beauti:ful· eyes, 
but the extra :fi:fty millions required :for. increasing the 
German Army. " The 1913-14 British naval estimates were thus 
approved at ~46,309,000, providing for five dreadnoughts 
against the demands by some naval advocates for six. 54 
Canadian :failure to contribute expected ships caused the 
1914-15 estimates to hit.;(51,580,000 as four dreadnoughts 
were to be laid down with possibly a fifth :from the 1915-16 
program to be started early. Reductions were promised in 
the estimates for 1915-16. 55 ,These reductions never occurred 
because of the outbreak of ",mr. 
The victor of the naval race is debatable. Brit~in 
certainly 'von the race quanti tat.ively' but it was much 
closer qualitatively (a question best answered in a com...: 
parison of the two fleets, see below). From 1905 until 1916 
Germany ' s Fleet reached 75 percent of Britain's only once, 
in 1908. On average, the High Sea Fleet was about 65 per-
cent of the Royal Navy's size . Total weight of broadside 
was even more in Britain ' s favor, almost 2:1. 56 Britain's 
numerical victory was wide at first glance, but her depen-
dence on the Royal :Navy for so much of her military might 
necessi tated such a margin to ensure victory, and if quali-
tative factors are · considered, the margin gro ..... 's much more 
narrow. 
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Another consequence of the Agadir Crisis was a change 
at the Admiralty. Despite wa:r:nings from Grey of impending 
military danger, · the Fleet was left scattered among several 
different home ports with the 2nd Division even having four 
days leave. Admiral Wilson, then t.he · First Sea Lord, was 
in Scotland for a pleasure weeke.nd . . Neanwhile the entire 
High Sea Fleet was concentrated off Nor1tvay. Hankey later 
complained, "What a chance for our friends across the, \'Ia-
tel:'! Ii Fisher's former foe Admiral Beresford declared that 
"if England had gone to war with Germany in July last,we 
Should have sustained a naval disaster." Parliament also 
raised the question of n.aval preparedness. 57 Because of 
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this pressure, Asquith decided to make changes at the Admir-
alty. Reginald McKenna, the First Lord at the time, though 
an able administrator, was not considered the man capable 
of forcing new reforms on the reluctant admiral.s. Haldane 
offered to go to the Admiralty and impose reforms like those 
he had accomplished at the ~"ar Office. Asquith, . however, con~ 
sidered that sending an "army man" to the Admiralty would 
be perceived as an insult by- the admirals so in October 
1911 Churchill was selected for the post instead. 58 Chur-
chill ' s task was to update and extend Fisher ' s reforms plus 
bring the :Navy into coaperation with the C.I.D. approved 
plans of the War Office. 
Before beginning his reforms, Churchill had to find a 
First Sea Lord with whom he could successfully work. Admiral 
Wilson ' s antipathy to a Naval Staff a.fld · to using the B. E ~ F. 
on the continent, led to his removal in l{ovember 1911. His 
successor,Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, was·ousted a year 
later because of his inco.mpatabili ty \'lith Churchill, in favor 
of Prince Louis of Battenberg. Battenberg ' s pliability and 
general support of reform allO\ved Churchill a free hand in 
reshaping the Navy for war . 59 
Effective as of 1 Hay 1912 a new command t the Home 
Fleets, was created and given to Admiral Sir George Callag-
han. It consisted of the First Fleet (fully manned, the .most 
modern ships), the Second Fleet (50 percent nucleus-crewed 
ships), and the Third Fleet (care and maintenance parties 
on the oldest ships). The Navy was redistributed so that 
the new Home Fleet s incorporated the old Home Fleet and 
Atlant.ic Fleet plus all the new dreadnoughts as they \vere 
completed. In its final form, the First Fleet was to con-
sist of four squadrons of eight ships each plus a fleet 
flagship. Including the eight nucleus-crewed ships of the 
Second Fleet, this would amount to 41 total British ships 
. 191 3 t t h t· t d 25 G h· 60 Th In 0 ma c an es lma e erman s lpS. e new 
organization of the Navy gave Britain a sufficient home 
water superiority, on watch constantly,. to ensure victory 
against any surprise attack by Germany. 
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Churchill, like Fisher before him, instituted anum- . 
ber of personnel reforms. He eliminated certain humiliating 
punishments and curtailed the powers of the ships' police, 
brought about a more generous leave system, gave officers 
and men a slight pay increase, and emphasizedpromoti~n by 
merit. Over several senior officers, Churchill made Rear 
Admiral David Beatty his Naval Secretary and promoted Vice-
Admiral John Jellicoe, twenty-first on the list of twenty-
t\,IO vice-admirals, to the Second-in-Command of the Home 
Fleets, a post virtually assuring him the command_after 
Callaghan. 61 Through these moves, Churchill brought able 
men, men whose careers had been built in the dreadnoughts, 
to .the places of power. 
Again, like Pisher, Churchill had a deep interest in 
improving mat§riel. He installed 15-inch guns, th~owing 
1,920 pound projectiles, in the five ships of the 1912-13 
program. Fisher had already innovated a 13 ·. 5-inch gUl'i. in 
the six ships of 1909-10. In addition to heavier armament, 
Churchill made the 191.2 ships into a "fast squadron" by the 
installation of oil rather than coal fueled engines. Oil 
reserves were ensured by the Governmentrs purchase of a 
controlling share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The 
quantity of the reserves to be kept in Britain was to be a 
4! month supply for reasons of economy though the Fisher 
Royal Commission, investgating the matter, had recommended 
a four year supply. During 1917 reserves '''ere to .fall dan-
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gerously low, a three week rs supply overall with some bases 
only having six days worth o.f oil. The change to oil was 
thus a dangerous move because of Britain's dependence all 
imports~ but the oil-.fueled ships were superior to cQal-
fueled ones, 62, ·and. oil, . like Fisher rs turbine engines, vIas 
the .future trend. Likewise, Churchill ' s 15-inch guns were 
logical extensions of Fisher's 12-inc~ers as they strength-
ened the "all-big-gun" principle. 
On the matter o.f the Naval Staf.f, Churchill differed 
from Fisher. Hankey had continually recommended and worked 
for the Staff, but Fisher and Admiral Wilson had both 
blocked it. When Churchill became First Lord, Esher pass.ed 
on to him some of Haa~ey's arguments for the Staff. Haldane 
also advised the creation of such a staff. Having been con-
vinced, Churchill announced the formation of a "Naval l'lar 
Staff!! on 1 January 1912 which \Vould have the responsibil-
ity of: 
. sifting, developing, and applying the re-
sults of history and experiment, and of preserv-
ing them as a general stock of reasoned opinion 
available as an aid and as a guide for all who 
are called upon to determine, in · peace or war, 
the naval policy of the country. 
Even so; the Staff did not become fully operational until 
the end of 1917.63 Had the Staff been established under 
Fisher, it would have had more time to develop and gain 
experience. Then some of the \Var's confusion might have 
been prevented, such as the Dardanelles fiasco. 
The Naval War Staff \'ias organized under a Chie:4' who 
reported directly to the First Sea Lord. It consisted of 
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three divisions-Operations, Intelligence, and Mobilization. 
After the war began, a Trade Division was created from a 
section of the . Operations Division. The Staff·s function 
was to study the operational side of war rather than the 
technic2.l or materiel sides. To train officers in staff 
duties the Royal Navy Staff College was established in 1912 
at the Naval Vlar College, Portsmouth. Though· hailed by 
Esher as "the most pregnant reform which ·has been carried 
out at the Admiralty since the days of Lord st. Vincent ,1t 
the Staff \'las only advisory and hence often ignored. 64 
Other problems, besides the lack of executive authority, 
were also apparent. The First Sea Lord. should have been 
also the Chief-of-Staff and thus more closely involved with 
it, the Staff ' s duties should have been more clearly defined 
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so as to not conflict with those of the First Sea Lord, and 
a better quality of officer should have been attracted to 
the Staff. The absence of good officers was because of the 
general dl.istrust of the Staff, whicb, was present throughout . 
the Fleet. Only after the war bagan was there more attention 
given to the Staff, but even then many of its recommendations 
were ignored. 65 The formation of a staff was a necessary 
move; its failure to accomplish more dramatic results was 
due both to its belated creation and to the faults in its 
structure, allowing the conservatism of high ranking officers 
to block its efforts. 
As early as 1908 Fisher had held discussions with the 
French as to which operations and zones might be left to 
them in the IVledi teranneari during war if both nations were 
allies. Only Asquith, Grey, and :fv1cKenna in the Cabinet had 
knowledge of the talks at thqt time. 66 Discussions ",ere 
resumed under Admiral Wilson which culniinated in the forma-
tion of detailed war contingency plans calling for the con-
centration of the French Fleet in the Mediterranean while 
the British Navy took on the responsibility of defending 
the French Atlantic and Channel coast. 67 This being con-
tingent upon the two nations entering a war as allies~ In 
September 1911 the French offered to take full responsi -:-
bility for the Mediterranean. Since this was accepted by 
Admiral Wilson, the French proceeded to concentrate twelve 
fully commis s ioned battleships arid six armored cruisers 
68 there hy January 1912. 
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The importance of the I1edi terranean to British commerce 
was unquestioned. According to a Cabinet report from the 
Board of Trade, a large percentage of her imported wheat, 
barley, oats, .oil, and iron ore came either from it or 
through it. Despite this,the report concluded that if the 
IJ[edi terranean were closed by a hostile fleet, there would 
only be a fe\v weeks of inconveni·,e'nce until new sources of 
imports and new routes of trade could be established~ Chur-
chill refuted arguments made by Esher for a strong British 
naval presence in the Nedi terranean by p.ointing out that a 
victory in the vital sector of the North Sea would have far-
reaching effects on the other theaters, but that the re-
verse could not occur. He added: 
Dispersion of strength, frittering cif money, empty 
parades of foolish little ships "displaying the 
flag" in unfrequented seas, are the .certain fea:-
tures ofoa ,policy leading through extravagance to 
defeat. "r 
In contrast, the C. I. D., discussing the IJIedi terranean si tu-
ation on 4 July 1912, decided that a Royal Navy presence 
there ,,,ould have an advantageous effect on the wavering 
nations of Italy and Turkey, so it recommended the sta-
tioning there of a fleet equal in strength to one of the 
IVIedi terranean powers, excluding France. This was deter-
mined to be three to four battlecruisers , four armored 
cruisers, and four pre~dreadnoughts based at ~alta. Other 
ships were t o be added as they and manpower became free . 
· 71 Cabinet approval for the scheme came on 5 July. 
Once the question of whether or not to keep British 
ships in the I-ledi terranean was settled, the problem of 
commitment or noncommitment to France had to be tackled . 
On 17 July Churchill warned the French naval attache that 
naval arrangements had no effect on political decisions. 
A draft Anglo-French naval statement follo\'led on 23 July, 
saying that any naval agreements were binding only if both 
nations found themselves to be allies in a war. All peace-
time dispositions were declared to be independent actions 
72 not based on a prearranged plan. In spite of this formal 
declaration of noncommitment, the French Foreign Minister, 
Pierre-Paul Cambon, was able to ask Grey on 1 August 1914: 
Are you going to let Cherbourg and Brest be bom-
barded? .•. when it is by your advice and with 
your consent, and to serve your interests as well 
as our ·own, tha13we have concentrated all our 
ships far away. 
Cambon was right; Britain had made a moral commitment to 
France even if it were not legally binding. Britain would 
have had to defend the northern coast of France, though 
she was not formally committed to do so, or suffer t he 
contempt of world opinion. 
TvfO main strategic considerations had to be analyzed 
by Britain before the war-invasion and blockade. Invasion 
had to be prevented by the Fleet as one of its reasons for 
existence . The blockade of German ports was seen as the 
only way to force a fight or to use superior seapower if 
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Germany kept its fleet in port. Yet to be det~rmined was 
ho\'o/' to accomplish both objectives. 
After vie\'ling the German Army maneuvers of 1906 , 
Churchill wrote, "I am very thankful there is a sea be-
tween that army and England.,,14 He therefore recommended 
to Fisher in 1908 that a regular army should be retained 
at home in order to repel an invasion of up to 150,000 
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men (this was thought to be the highest practical figure 
for an invasion). "Would it or would it not be \'vorth while" 
to Germany he questioned "to sacrifice 60,000 men for the 
pleasure of burning London?,,75 Again it must stressed that 
any invasion attempt had to be stopped by the Fleet as the 
British Army was too small for such a task, especially if 
the B.E.F. was sent to the continent. The C.I.D. concluded, 
after an exhaustive study of the question, that as long as 
British seapower remained supreme, there viaS no danger of 
invasion. It said, nonetheless, that an army should be on 
guard to repel any raids of under 70,000 men that might 
elude the Fleet. It was the C.I.D. ' s recommendation that 
a small regular force should be kept in addition to the 
mobilized Territorials to defend against this eventuality.76 
Some admirals even favored Lord Robert's conscriptionist 
theories because they thought that a large home army would 
free the Fleet from having to watch the British ~oasts for 
an invasion fleet. General naval opinion, however, was con-
fident . that the Fleet alone would be able to prevent an 
invasion. In this they agreed with st. Vincent ' s statement 
during a similar invasion scare of the nineteenth century: 
"I do not say they CarLYJ.ot come, my Lords. I only say they 
cannot come by sea. ,, 77 Naval confidence was high on this 
matter, and, as it happened, no invasion or raid to land 
troops vIas to be made during the war. 
Actual Fleet exercises dealing with invasion were 
carried out in 1912 and 1913. In the July 1913 maneuvers 
the defences of the east coast were tested. Jellicoe, in 
command of the invasion fleet, was able to elude the de-
fensive fleet and land 40,000 men. The exercises were 
cut short for fear of giving valuable information to Ger-
many. Hankey took a calmer view of the exercises as he 
pointed out that of 10.7.,000 men attempting to invade , 
46,000 had been assessed as "drowned or captured II \'lhile 
18,000 more. mEn had been taken ?ff by the invasion fleet 
after having landed. This left 43,000 men, which Hankey 
70 
was confident that the home forces would be able to take 
care of. 78 Finally in 1914, just before the war, the C.I.D. 
reiterated its 1907-08 conclusions that a small regular 
force plus the Territorials would be sufficient to defeat 
any invasion which might slip by the Fleet. 79 The fear of 
invasion, nevertheless, affected many as.pects of British 
military planning. The Fleet was tied to stopping one, 
regular forces had to be detached from the B.E.F. to meet 
one, and it increased the already high tension between 
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Britain and Germany. 
Blockading Germany and preventing a like blockade of 
Britain \'lere major concerns for the Royal Havy; While 
invasion could cause sudden defeat, a .. blockade could slmvly 
starve Britain into submission. By the late nineteenth 
century~ Britain \'las dependent on imports for two-thirds 
of her foodstuffs and much of her raw materials. 80 There 
was never more than a six weeks' food supply in hand so 
that the effects of commerce raiding could also have 
grievous consequences on Britain within a relatively short 
tirrie span. Enemy cruisers were the expected weapons of 
commerce raiding and although losses were expected to be 
heavy at first, the Chief Umpire of the 1906 maneuvers ob-
served: 
It is practically certain that the commencement of 
the third week of the war would have seen all 
co~~erce destroying ships either captured or blo~k­
aded in their defended ports. 
This prediction was only partially ac.c1l1.rate since it .did · not 
forese:e the development of the submarine as a long range 
weapon. Only Fisher disagreed with the consensus that no 
civilized nation would use the submarine because it could 
not pick up the survivors of the ships it might sink. 
Churchill believed this right up to the beginning of the 
war. 81 In contrast, Churchill was correct in hi~ assess-
ment of the importance of keeping Britain's commerce f10\',--
ing. Order, he said, "depends almost exclusively upon the 
poorer people being able to purchase a certain minimum 
amount of the staple foods, especially bread , at prices 
\vhich they Can afford. ,,82 If Britain were to starve, her 
will to fight would soon collapse. This almost did occur 
in the spring of 1917 when Germany launched unlimited 
submarine warfare. 
A blockade could also be an offensive weapon for 
Britain as an Admiralty statement in 1906 concluded,that 
"the British threat upon German trade is a tremendous one, 
both by reason of Britain's overwhelming preponderance at 
sea and of her geographical position" 83 · (see rvlap . 1 ). When 
the Declaration of London in 1907 threatened to minimize 
the effects of blockade by contravening a belligerent na":' 
tion's right to seize neutral shipping, Hankey was one of 
those who fought against British ratification. Eventually 
the House of Lords rejected it, but the Liberal Government 
clairp.ed that it would abide by it anyway.84 By 1908 a 
Nelsonian "close blockade" had been made impractical by 
the development of mines and torpedoes, so it was decided 
that in future the blockading fleet would withdraw out 
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of surprise torpedo range,at night. In 1912 an'bbservational 
blockade" (see map) vias substituted, whereby cruisers' and 
destroyers would patrol a line from Norway to Holland in 
order to give warning of a German fleet approaching Britain. 
Just before the war, this too was discarded in favor of a 
blockade of the entire North Sea to lessen attrition on the 
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the Straits of Dover and of the northern exit between 
Scotland and Norway. The Grand Fleet (the renamed Home 
Fleets) was to wait in port for the patrolling cruisers 
to intercept the High Sea Fleet, and periodically make 
sweeps of its own in an attempt to catch the German Fleet 
out of its ports. 85 The new strategy allowed the Germans 
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out of their ports but confined them to the North Sea. It 
also economized on the losses which would have been suffered 
from German raids on a "close" or .'~observational blockade ~" 
Essential.to the success of this rllong blockade lf was 
a base on the east coast. Among the contenders were (see 
map) Rosyth, Cromarty, and Scapa Flow. Rosyth was eliminated 
because if the Forth Bridge was demolished, it would have 
blocked the Fleet off from the sea. Cromarty and Scapa Flow 
were at equal distances from the German bases and far enough 
away from them in stDrmy waters to lessen the dangers of a 
surprise raid by destroyers or submarines. After much dis-
cussion, Cromarty \vas chosen as the Fleet "s base over 
Scapa Flow because of the latteri's inaccessibility by land 
from Britain and the impossibility of defending the east 
coast from that distance. Scapa Flow was thus left as an 
undefended anchorage. When the Admiralty requested funds 
to install defences, it was turned dO\vn by th~ C.I.D. On 
Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, vol. 1: 
The Road to War, 1904~1914 (L6ndon: Oxford University Press, 
1""%1;,pp-. 422~23-. - ~ 
the east coast only Chatham, far to the south, was a .first 
class port at the opening of the war. Surprisingly, when 
war began, Churchill sent the Fleet to Scapa Flow.86 Bri-
tish difficulties in selecting a base were partially due 
to the evolutionary state of blockade. Yet the failure 
to have a proper base at the outset of the war \'ias an in-
excusable oversight and was to result in having the Fleet 
sent in 1914 to the totally undefended anchorage at Scapa 
Flow. 
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Tactical thought was infrequently studied by prewar 
British naval officers. The same "line of battle!! employed 
before Nelson ' s time, and violated by him, still held sway. 
Fleets were expected to cruise in columns then rapidly 
deploy in a long line for battle. It was true that "line 
ahead" (same as II line of battle") \'ias the only way o f de-
ploying a fleet without some ships having their guns masked 
by friendly vessels, but it stressed a doctrine which was 
too rigid and centralized . in the flagship. Initiative was 
thus taken away from local commanders \'iho might have better 
kno\'iledge of the situation, because they \'rere used to wai t-
ing for orders from the flagship. Another deficiency was 
the lack of British night fighting practice. German ships 
practiced this almost half the time, in contrast. Hence 
they were ready for the night fighting at Jutland while the 
British were not. 87 
Combined operations also received little naval study. 
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This was because of Fisher ' s opposition to the War Office1s 
continental strategy. H.e preferred quoting Grey ' s state-
ment that "The British Army is a projectile to be fired 
by the Navy." Fisher wanted the B.E.F. landed on the Baltic 
coast thirty miles from Berlin where it could draw off 
German reserves and disrupt Germany's entire war effort . 
Admiral Wilson continued Fisher's arguments, but the ap-
pointment of Churchill to the Admiralty soon ended these 
naval schemes and brought the Navy in line with War Office 
thinking. 88 Only after the war had started \vould Churchill 
hims elf revive some of these schemes. 
When \'-Tar was declared, the British Navy had the backing 
of a great naval tradition, but it also had severe deficiencies ~ 
The gunnery expert Percy Scott exclaimed: 
..• we had no up-to-date mine layers, nor an 
efficient mine; no properly fitted mine sweepers; 
no arrangements for guarding our ships against 
mines; no efficient method of using our guns at 
night; no anti-Zeppelin guns; no anti-submarine 
precautions; no safe harbour for our Fleet, and 
only a few ships (eight) \vere partly fi tted with 
a proper method of firing their guns. O!J.I' tor-
pedoes were so badly fitted that in the early days 
of the war they went u§§er the German ships in-
stead of hitting them. 
IIi many areas of construction the German ships were equal 
or superior to their ,British counterparts. British ships 
had larger calibre guns with a heavier broadside than the 
Germans. British fire tended to be more accurate during 
most of a battle due to Scott ' s invention of the gun dir-
ector system. Under this system one man aimed and fired 
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all the guns of a ship electronically at the same moment. 
In tests between identical ships, director firing scored 
six times as many hits as a ship without it. It was not 
until Jutland, though, that most British ships had the 
system installed. British shells, though larger, had poorer 
penetration qualities than German shells . Often they would 
just bounce off when hitting at an oblique angle or- they 
would detonate before penetrating, thus making a large hole 
in the ship's armor rather than exploding in her interior. 90 
On paper, British ships were faster than their German 
equivalents, but in operation there ~ppeared little differ~ 
ence. At Dogger Bank three German battle-cruisers managed 
to elude five British battle-cruisers~ Likewise the Goeben, 
in a headlong race, was able to stay ahead of British battle-
cruisers in 1914. One reason German ships were able ' to keep 
up with the British, despite the broader beam in the German 
vessels, was their adoption of a more efficient small tube 
boiler in 1907 while the Royal Navy did not get these un-
til 1915-16. 91 German ships were also more heavily armored 
and had the armor distributed better. Coal bunkers were 
placed in the most vulnerable areas to cushion shell im-
pact, and steps \V'ere taken to prevent shell-flash from enter-
ing the magazines. The British did not discover shell-flash 
until after they had lost three battle-cruisers to it at 
Jutland. ,Better compartmentalization and superb pumping and 
counter-flooding systems made German ships almost unsinkable. 
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Compared with the British battleship Audacious (1910 con-
struction) which was sunk with one mine, the 1909 Goeben 
survived five such hits. 92 Gertnan quality "las not surpassed 
by the British until the construction of the "Queen Eliza-
beth" class of dreadnoughts. 93 Superior German construction 
was made possible by the fact that German vessels, designed 
to fight . for a few days at a time, could sacrifice crew 
comfort for fighting efficiency. The Royal Navy on the 
other hand was a world navy and so had to have ships capa-
ble of making long voyages. 
Counter measures against submarines and torpedoes 
were totally experimental in 1914. neither was there any 
sure way of locating submarines once they had submerged. 
One defensive measure devised called for the Fleet to 
always cruise at high speeds while keeping a zigzagging 
course. At the same time destroyers would be screening the 
capital ships. In this way submarine s would get only one 
shot at ~est at a very fast moving target with destroyers 
ready to interfere at every point. By 1912 the destroyer 
had evolved from a torpedo attack vessel into a defensive 
measure against submarines and destroyers . themselves, with 
the exchange of more and larger guns for less torpedoes. 
The Ramillies in 1913 became the firs·t dreadnought, and the 
last until after the war,to be fitted with a bulge below 
the waterline to take the impact of a torpedo ·and prevent 
a penetration of the hull. 94 When the Naval War Staff in 
191 2 _warned that Germany might use her submarines for 
commerce raiding, Churchill was impressed, but the Board 
did not take the suggestion seriou~ly. Scott's view that 
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the submarine had made the battleship obsolete was violently 
attacked by naval conservatives. But, at _the same time in 
Germany, Tirpitzwas also underestimating the value of the 
submarine as a military weapon. 95 
Torpedoes were also carried by destroyers,which at 
the beginning of the war were considered more dangerous 
than submarines. Results of torpedo attacks in the Russo-
Japanese War had been poor, however. The Japanese _scored 
only 17 hits out of 370 torpedoes fired in battle. But, 
since that time, the torpedo's range had increased from 
4-4,500 yards (1905) to 11,000 yards (1914) \'lith an overall 
-
increase in speed from 19 knots set for 4,000 yards to 
45 -kr.l.Ot s set for 7,000 yards. Their diameters increased 
from 14 -inches in 1905 to 21 inches by the outbreak of the 
war. Admiral Sir William May, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, 
warned in 1910: 
in mi~ty weather an attack by destroyers in a fleet 
action is not only possible, but unless recognized 
and means are taken to defeat it, such an attack 
would probably succeed .96 - -
Mines had been proven very successful in the Russo-Japan-
ese War as they had sunk fourteen ships, including three 
battleships. Yet there was little interest in them among 
the British naval experts. Hence,in 1914 the Royal Navy had 
no policy for the use of mines and was technically far 
behind Germany and ·Russia in their development. 97 
Advances in aerial technology l ed Asquith to appoint 
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a C.I.D. subcommittee under Esher in 1908 to investigate 
military uses of it. · The Air Sub-Committee recommended in 
1910 the construction of a rigid airship and the formation 
of an aviators corps. In April 1912 the Royal Flying Corps, 
with Naval and Nilitary Wings, was created. 98 The .. Havyfs 
inexperience and -the lack of qualified engineers made 
British efforts at developing airships fail while Germany 
kept and expanded its lead in this weapon. 99 Planes and 
seaplanes received much more attention and enthusiasm at 
the Admiralty, especially by Churchill who took to the air 
himself. Fisher predicted in 1913 that "aviation will surely 
supplant cruisers It as the scouts . of the Fleet. Little thought 
was given to planes attacking ships though.: there were . some 
advocates of this tactic. 100 British aerial progress was 
still in its formative stages at the beginning of the war, 
but its possibilities were recognized by those in power. 
In 1914 the Fleet was ready to go to war. Its strategy 
was no longer at cross purposes to that of the War Office 
and it had formulated its plans for a blockade against 
Germany if she did not come out and fight. Britain had a 
clear edge in numbers even if Germany had a qualitative 
superiority. Perhaps the one extra British advantage was 
her naval tradition which gave her men the courage to want 
. to try battle with Germany . After all, it was Germany which 
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\Vas blockaded in the North Sea, not Britain. The German 
Fleet which had everything to gain £rom a battle against 
the British and nothing to "lose (assuming the £leet i tsel£ 
was expendable £or some greater purpose such as an invasion 
o£ England) contented itself with small raids until even 
these grew rare. 
CONCLUSION 
\'lhen war was declared in 1914, Britain was far better · 
prepared to take part in it than she would have been in 
1898. The British failures in the Boer War proved to be a 
stimulus for reform throughout Britain ' s military struc-
ture. The Committe e of Imperial Defence was formed, the 
Haldane reforms were executed at the \'lar Office, and at 
the Admiralty Fisher and Churchill reshaped · it for \var. By 
the outbreak of war , most of the reforms had been accom-
plished, and though not perfectly prepared for war ( Is any 
nation?), Britain did have the military organization to 
fight a war in her interests and in her \'lay. 
The creation of the C.I.D. was a vi~al step in the 
process of reforming the British military for it 900rdinated 
the efforts of the service departments ",ith each other and 
wi th the \'lishes of the Government. During the Continental 
versus Blue Water debate it was able to mediate and then 
make the recommendation, which \vas accepted, to accept the 
former s chool!s plans. The C.I.D. also represented almost 
a standing committee on reform since its investigations 
and studies often led to changes in military procedure. Its 
work on ae~ial weapons \vas an example of this. Yet perhaps 
the C.1. D. ' s greatest contribution lay in its broad 
approach to d"efence" questions. Be.cause .i t was not con-
.fined to army or naval considerations, it was able to ex-
amine all aspects, even civilian oriented, of a problem 
and then present a recommendation not colored by depart-
mental interests. 
The Army undoubtedly pro.fited most from the Boer War 
because of its direct involvement and failure. It conse-
quently adopted a General-Staff, modernized its tactics 
and strategy, and,;above all, was reorganized by Haldane 
into a flexible striking force backed by an expandable 
system of reserves both as a home defence force and as a 
source of reinforcement. The General-Staff coordinate'd the 
various sections of the Army in much the same way as the 
C.I.D. did for total defence. In addition it made careful 
studies of possible future army operations and dre\'! up 
detailed plans for every eventuality. The specific go.als 
of the plans might be criticized, but their thoroughness 
,was extraordinary. This was why the B.E.F. was moved so 
quickly and efficiently to the battlefront in 1914. 
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Naval reform, though not as dramatic ' as Haldane's re-
forms, was nevertheless necessary and effective. Fisher's 
personnel reforms upgraded the quality of officers and roen. 
His innovation of the Dreadnought brought about a revolution 
in naval warfare. Churchill then extended the Fisher reforms 
to include the Naval v.far Staff and an acceptance of the 
Army's Continental strategy. In 1914 the British Navy was 
larger than the G~rman Fleet and far more confident of 
succeSs. Any quality differences were made up by the con-
struction of the "Queen Elizabeths." The Royal Navy, in 
short, was aggressive and ready for war. The one major 
flaw, the lateness in the creation of the Staff, held it 
back from being completely prepared, but in the short 
time Churchill had to work, the Navy did begin to take a 
serious look at the study of naval warfare which was to 
culminate in the fully operational Staff in 1917. 
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Bri tain ' s island status and small Army made :,the Navy 
her main military arm. The Navy was expected to defend 
against invasion, plus transport the Army, defend British 
commerce, and take the offensive to the enemy_ She was to 
succeed in all these areas though the last two were accom- · 
plished only with difficulty. German use of the submarine 
as a commerce raider was an qnexpected development, except 
to some like Fisher and Scott, so there were no means with 
which to meet it. Only after near disaster \'!ould the convoy 
system be revived to defeat the submarine. Had there been 
a proper staff in existence long before the war, this so-
lution might have been found sooner. Blockade was the Royal 
NavyAs answer to an enemy who would not fight. This proved 
to be a very effective weapon against Germany as Britain 
used her seapower to cut ' uff impDrts and exports and thus 
slowly choke Germany. 
While the blockade was a contributory factor in bringing 
about Germany r s defeat , it vias Britain r s Army comnii tted to 
Continental principles which was to take Germany on as a 
land power and hold on even after the French Army was 
defeated as an offensive instrument. ,This transformation 
of Britain from a naval power to a land power possessing 
a strong navy was the result of the Continentalist victory 
before the war. Had not this change in policy been made, 
it is doubtful whether the British Navy could have had 
much effect against German land power even if' the German 
Fleet was sunk. 
Though Britain had the instruments with which to 
fight a war, her conception of what a future Vlar would be 
like was colored by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
Britain like everyother European nation expected a short 
decisive war in which speed would mean~everything at the 
beginning. In th~s belief British leaders were joined by 
the major body of expert opinion. A few men like Kitchener 
guessed right but they were not heard over those calling 
for decisive campaigns. With this conception of what the 
war vwuld be like in mind , Britain was prepared to fight 
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it in her way. The Royal Navy would be her main weapon while 
the Army would be used to intervene on the continent. Both 
services stood up to their duties "lell. Had such a war come 
in 1899 instead of a small colonial affair in South Africa, 
Britain ' would have suffered disaster far surpassing that 
of the Boer War. Disaster from which it might not havS 
recovered. Such was the difference between 1899 and 1914 
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